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Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity
Margaret Z. Johns.∗
I. INTRODUCTION
While certainly the vast majority of prosecutors are ethical lawyers
engaged in vital public service, the undeniable fact is that many innocent
people have been wrongly convicted of crimes as a result of
prosecutorial misconduct.1 Prosecutors are rarely disciplined or
criminally prosecuted for their misconduct,2 and the victims of this
misconduct are generally denied any civil remedy because of
prosecutorial immunities.3
In litigation under the major federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. §
1983, two kinds of immunity apply to prosecutors: absolute immunity
and qualified immunity. The immunity that applies depends on the

∗ Senior Lecturer, University of California, School of Law, Davis; J.D., University of
California, School of Law, Davis, 1976; B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1970. Many
thanks to my colleagues, Laura Batie, Alan Brownstein, Anupam Chander, Susan Christian, Lisa
Pruitt, Jim Smith, Marty West, Carter White, and Tobias Wolff, for their suggestions and
encouragement. I am indebted to my student, Andrew Whang, for volunteering to read an early draft
and offering many helpful comments. I am grateful to Suzellen Darden, Rita Golden, Waleen Kostal,
Pam Johnston, Ruth Morgan, and Carolyn Oltraver for their friendship and enthusiasm for this
project. Most importantly, my thanks to my family, especially Frank, Bob, and Hope, for their love
and support.
1. CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR: INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S LOCAL
PROSECUTORS 45–47, app. at 108–09 (2003) [hereinafter HARMFUL ERROR]; BARRY SCHECK ET AL.,
ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED app. 2, at 263 (2000); Marshall J. Hartman & Stephen L. Richards, The Illinois Death
Penalty: What Went Wrong?, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 409, 423 (2001) (detailing rates of
prosecutorial misconduct in Illinois); Kenneth Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial and Error: How
Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice To Win (pts. 1–5), CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10–14, 1999; Innocence Project, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Dec. 3, 2004); James S. Liebman et al., A Broken
System:
Error
Rates
in
Capital
Cases,
1973–1995
(2000),
at
http://www.justice.policy.net/jpreport/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2004); see also infra text
accompanying notes 42–65.
2. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 78–80; James S. Liebman, The Overproduction
of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2121–24 (2000); see also infra text accompanying notes 123–
31.
3. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 43–44; Liebman, supra note 2, at 2121; Lesley E.
Williams, Note, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441, 3453–63 (1999).
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function the prosecutor was performing at the time of the misconduct.4
When prosecutors act as advocates, absolute immunity applies.5 Under
absolute immunity, prosecutors are immunized even when the plaintiff
establishes that the prosecutor acted intentionally, in bad faith, and with
malice.6 When prosecutors act as investigators or administrators,
qualified immunity applies.7 Under qualified immunity, prosecutors are
immunized unless the misconduct violated clearly established law of
which a reasonable prosecutor would have known.8 This functional
approach to prosecutorial immunity has created confusion and conflict in
the lower courts.9 Together, these immunities deny civil remedies to
innocent people who have been wrongly convicted of crimes as a result
of prosecutorial misconduct. While qualified immunity strikes a balance
between providing a remedy for egregious misconduct and protecting the
honest prosecutor from liability,10 absolute immunity should be
reconsidered.
In adopting absolute prosecutorial immunity, the Supreme Court
relied on historical understandings and contemporary policies.11 Both
justifications are dubious. According to the Court’s interpretation of
history, Congress intended to retain well-established common-law
4. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127–29 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
268–69 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991).
5. Burns, 500 U.S. at 487–96 (holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability
for false statements in a probable cause hearing); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)
(holding that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for using false testimony at trial); see
also infra Parts III and IV.
6. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427; see Williams, supra note 3, at 3457–61
(collecting cases in which prosecutors received absolute immunity for inducing perjury, failing to
disclose exculpatory evidence, fabricating evidence and presenting false testimony, improperly
influencing witnesses, initiating a prosecution without probable cause, and breaching plea
agreements).
7. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 122–23 (holding that a prosecutor who swore to false facts in an
affidavit is entitled to qualified immunity, not absolute immunity); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 272–76
(holding that a prosecutor who conspired with police to manufacture false evidence is entitled to
qualified immunity, not absolute immunity); Burns, 500 U.S. at 492–96 (holding that a prosecutor
receives qualified immunity for giving legal advice to the police); see Williams, supra note 3, at
3461–63 (collecting cases in which prosecutors received qualified immunity for providing incorrect
information in a search warrant, failing to protect witnesses at risk of violence, leaking false and
defamatory information to the media, conducting illegal wiretaps, and participating in illegal
searches and seizures).
8. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268.
9. See infra Part IV.B.
10. See infra Part V.B.5.
11. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123–29; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 267–71; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–87;
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417–29.
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immunities when it adopted § 1983 in 1871.12 But even assuming
Congress intended to retain the existing common-law immunities,
absolute prosecutorial immunity was not the established law in 1871.13
In fact, the first case affording prosecutors absolute immunity was not
decided until 1896.14 Congress could not have intended to retain this
immunity when it adopted § 1983 because it simply did not exist at that
time. Rather, in 1871 prosecutors would have been accorded qualified
immunity, not absolute immunity.15 Thus, the historical argument for
absolute prosecutorial immunity is unfounded.
The policy reasons supporting absolute prosecutorial immunity are
equally untenable. The Court has justified absolute prosecutorial
immunity on the grounds that the threat of civil liability would
undermine vigorous prosecutorial performance, constrain independent
decisionmaking, and divert time and resources to defending frivolous
litigation.16 In short, in the Court’s view, exposing prosecutors to civil
liability would burden and undermine the functioning of the criminal
justice system.
But contrary to this policy argument, absolute immunity is not
needed to prevent frivolous litigation or to protect the judicial process.
Absolute immunity protects the dishonest prosecutor but is unnecessary
to protect the honest prosecutor since the requirements for establishing a
cause of action and the defense of qualified immunity will protect all but
the most incompetent and willful wrongdoers.17 Specifically, under a
qualified immunity regime, the victim of misconduct can only maintain
an action by defeating the criminal charges18 and proving that the
prosecutor violated clearly established constitutional law19 with a
culpable state of mind.20 And the qualified immunity defense has been
strengthened to provide a complete defense at the earliest stages of

12. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–85;
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417–18.
13. See infra Part V.A.
14. Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896) (holding that a prosecutor is entitled to
absolute immunity).
15. See infra Part V.A.
16. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124–25; Burns, 500 U.S. at 485–87; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423–29. See
generally infra Part IV.A.
17. See infra Part V.B.5.
18. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); see infra text accompanying notes 569–84.
19. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see infra Part V.B.5.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 590–600.
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litigation for all but the most inexcusable misconduct.21 Thus, qualified
immunity provides prosecutors sufficient protection to ensure that they
perform their functions independently, without undue timidity or
distraction.22 In short, in all cases qualified immunity for prosecutors
would provide sufficient protection to the criminal justice system, while
providing a necessary remedy for prosecutorial misconduct.23
In addition to protecting the dishonest prosecutor at the expense of
the innocent victim, absolute immunity violates public policy for other
reasons as well. Absolute immunity frustrates the purpose of civil rights
legislation by failing to deter frequent and egregious misconduct.24 It
also hinders the development of constitutional standards and the
implementation of structural solutions for systemic problems.25
Prosecutorial liability—with the safeguard of qualified immunity to
prevent vexatious litigation—is necessary to ensure the integrity of the
criminal justice system.26
Moreover, not only is the doctrine of absolute immunity unsupported
by history and contrary to public policy, but its practical application is
also unnecessarily confusing and unworkable.27 It has produced circuit
splits on at least four distinct issues, which, surprisingly, have not been
addressed in the scholarly commentary. First, the circuits are split on
whether the criminal defendant’s due process rights are violated when a
prosecutor coerces a witness to testify falsely.28 Second, they are divided
on whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when she
fabricates evidence or coerces a witness to testify falsely and then uses

21. See infra text accompanying notes 601–19.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 610–19.
23. See infra Part V.B.
24. See infra Part V.B.3.
25. See infra Part V.B.4.
26. See infra Part V.B.
27. See infra Part IV.B.
28. Compare Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the coercion
of a witness does not violate a defendant’s right to due process), and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20
F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994) (same), with Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
the coercion of a witness violates a defendant’s due process rights). While the merits of the due
process claim are distinct from the immunity defense, the operation of the absolute immunity
defense produces this conflict because it resolves cases without reaching the merits of the dispute
and thus impedes the resolution of the substantive issues. See generally infra Part IV.B.1 and Part
V.B.4.
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that tainted evidence in a judicial proceeding.29 Third, the circuit
decisions have taken different approaches to the probable cause
requirement for absolute immunity announced in Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons.30 Finally, they are split on how to determine whether a
prosecutor is acting as an investigator or advocate when she engages in
misconduct after probable cause has been met.31 In Justice Thomas’s
opinion, the Court should review the current immunity law both to
consider a remedy for egregious misconduct and also to resolve the
current conflicts in the courts of appeals.32
The reconsideration of absolute prosecutorial immunity is especially
urgent for two reasons: (1) recent empirical studies establish that
prosecutorial misconduct is a significant factor contributing to numerous
wrongful convictions of innocent people;33 and (2) emerging circuit
splits on the application of the absolute prosecutorial immunity doctrine
suggest that it is becoming increasingly unworkable and is in fact
undermining the goals it was designed to achieve.34
First, a 2003 study presents alarming evidence of the frequency of
prosecutorial misconduct resulting in the wrongful conviction of
hundreds of innocent people.35 This conclusion is reinforced with the
ongoing investigation by the Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, which reported that, as of January 2005, 154 people who
served time in prison for crimes they did not commit have been
exonerated by DNA evidence.36 In many of these cases, prosecutorial
29. Compare Michaels, 222 F.3d 118 (holding that absolute immunity applies), with Milstein
v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that qualified immunity applies), and Zahrey, 221
F.3d 342 (same). See generally infra Part IV.B.2.
30. 509 U.S. 259 (1993). Compare Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 796–98 (6th Cir.
2003) (applying absolute immunity despite absence of probable cause), Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d
189, 191–95 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same), Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 1993) (same), and
Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 661–62 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying absolute immunity where
probable cause was based on coerced testimony), with Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1011 (applying qualified
immunity where the finding of probable cause was based on false evidence). See generally infra Part
IV.B.3.
31. Compare Hill, 45 F.3d at 662–63 (holding that whether a prosecutor is acting as an
investigator or as an advocate depends on an objective analysis), with Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d
627, 633–36 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that whether a prosecutor is acting as an investigator or as an
advocate depends on his or her subjective state of mind). See generally infra Part IV.B.4.
32. See Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118, 1119 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.).
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part IV.B.3 and 4.
35. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1.
36. Innocence Project, supra note 1.

57

2JOH-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/11/2005 11:42:54 AM

[2005

misconduct contributed to the wrongful convictions.37 Based on these
studies, one can no longer dismiss the problem of prosecutorial
misconduct as infrequent nor pretend that sufficient safeguards exist in
the system to protect the innocent from wrongful convictions.
Second, the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity is proving
increasingly problematic in the lower courts. Attempting to apply the
current absolute immunity defense, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
recently applied a subjective standard to the determination of whether a
prosecutor was acting as an advocate or an investigator.38 This standard
requires extensive discovery into the details of the criminal investigation
and creates questions of fact as to the prosecutor’s subjective state of
mind, which cannot be readily resolved by pretrial motions.39 This
approach effectively defeats the entire purpose for the immunity
defenses, which is to protect officials not only from the burden of
liability, but also from the burden of litigation.40 In other words, in these
circuits—and in others that may follow their lead—the current immunity
doctrine not only deprives the victim of a needed remedy, it also deprives
honest prosecutors of the protection they deserve from burdensome and
distracting litigation.
This Article begins by outlining the significance of the problem of
absolute prosecutorial immunity. Specifically, Part II discusses the
frequency of prosecutorial misconduct and wrongful convictions and
explains the inadequacy of current deterrents and corrective mechanisms.
I begin with this exposition of the problem because in developing the
absolute immunity doctrine the federal courts have not taken into account
the vast and mounting evidence of frequent and unchecked prosecutorial
misconduct resulting in the wrongful incarceration of many innocent
people. Rather, courts confidently assert that civil liability is unnecessary
because other mechanisms are sufficient to deter and correct
prosecutorial misconduct.41 Absolute immunity would not be a serious
37. Id.
38. KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1110–12 (9th Cir. 2004); Genzler v. Longanbach, 384
F.3d 1092, 1098–1100 (9th Cir. 2004); Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003);
Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003); see infra Part IV.B.4.
39. KRL, 384 F.3d at 1110–12; Genzler, 384 F.3d at 1098–1100; Broam, 320 F.3d at 1033;
Cousin, 325 F.3d at 633–35; see infra Part IV.B.4.
40. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–
18 (1982).
41. See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991); Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 522 (describing
the legal system as a “self-correcting” process); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512–13 (1978);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427–29 (1976); Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118, 122 (3d
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problem if prosecutors rarely engaged in misconduct, if corrective
mechanisms were effective, and if innocent people were not wrongfully
convicted. To the extent that the current absolute immunity doctrine is
based on such mistaken assumptions, it is important to recognize the
truth about prosecutorial misconduct.
Part III provides a brief historical background of § 1983 liability and
the immunity defenses. Part IV describes the current state of the law,
beginning in Part IV.A with the Court’s current functional approach to
prosecutorial immunity. Part IV.B details the current conflicts and
confusion in the lower courts. Part V argues that absolute prosecutorial
immunity should be abandoned and replaced in all circumstances by
qualified immunity. Finally, Part VI presents a more modest proposal:
even if absolute immunity were preserved for some core prosecutorial
functions, it should not apply when the prosecutor has failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence, nor should it be expanded to shield prosecutorial
misconduct during the investigative phase.
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Four recent, major studies have confirmed the frequency of
prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct.42 All four concluded that
significant numbers of innocent people have been convicted in part as a
result of prosecutorial misconduct.43 Additionally, they all found that
many innocent people have been sent to death row as a result of
prosecutorial misconduct.44 Furthermore, all four concluded that
prosecutors are neither criminally prosecuted nor disciplined for their
misconduct.45 In light of these findings, one can no longer indulge in the
comforting but false fantasy that our criminal justice system sufficiently
protects the innocent from prosecutorial misconduct and ensuing
wrongful convictions.
Cir. 2000); Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Harm to a falsely-charged
defendant is remedied by safeguards built into the judicial system—probable cause hearings,
dismissal of the charges—and into the state codes of professional responsibility.”).
42. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1; SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1; James S. Liebman et al.,
Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2000); Liebman,
supra note 2; Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1.
43. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at i; SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, app. 2; Liebman,
supra note 2, at 2094; Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1, Jan. 10, 1999.
44. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 92–107; SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at xiv;
Liebman, supra note 2, at 2094 n.160; Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1, Jan 10, 1999.
45. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 78–90; SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 175, 180–
81; Liebman, supra note 2, at 2121–22; Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1, Jan. 10, 1999.
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Specifically, in 2003 the Center for Public Integrity reported its
finding that since 1970 there have been over 2000 cases in which
prosecutorial misconduct by state and local prosecutors was sufficiently
prejudicial to require charges to be dismissed, convictions to be reversed,
or sentences to be reduced.46 In 513 additional cases, prosecutorial
misconduct was discussed in dissenting and concurring opinions.47 And
in thousands of other cases, appellate courts found prosecutorial
misconduct but upheld the convictions under the harmless error
standard.48 The report catalogued fifty-four cases of prosecutorial
misconduct in which innocent people were convicted of serious crimes,
including murder, rape, kidnapping, and robbery; in many of these cases,
the innocent were sentenced to death.49 Yet, of the 2000 cases of
prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct, prosecutors were disciplined in
only forty-four cases and were never criminally prosecuted.50
In 2000, the Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law at Yeshiva University published a major report on wrongful
convictions. It revealed that as of August, 1999, DNA testing established
“that 76 people had been sent to prison and death row for crimes they did
not commit.”51 Prosecutorial misconduct was a factor in twenty-six
percent of those cases.52 According to this ongoing project, as of January
2005, 154 innocent people who served time in prison for crimes they did
not commit have been exonerated by DNA evidence.53 Yet, like the
Public Integrity study, the Innocence Project found that prosecutors were
rarely held accountable for their misconduct.54

46. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at i, 2; id. app. at 108–09.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. app. at 92–107. Of these cases, one wrongful conviction occurred in the 1960s; twelve
wrongful convictions occurred in the 1970s; thirty-one wrongful convictions occurred in the 1980s;
and ten wrongful convictions occurred in the 1990s. The data from the 1990s to date is very
preliminary given the length of time involved in capital prosecutions, appeals, and habeas
proceedings. For example, in California it typically takes a decade for the direct appeal of a capital
conviction to be resolved. Bob Egelko, State’s Chief Justice Praises Long Appeals Process, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 15, 2004, at A21. The subsequent state and federal habeas actions may last an
additional five to ten years. Id. According to Professor Liebman, the average time for appellate and
habeas review of a capital case is eleven years. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2056.
50. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 78–90.
51. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at xiv.
52. Id. app. 2, at 263.
53. Innocence Project, supra note 1.
54. Id.; SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 175, 180–181.
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Two other national studies reached similar conclusions. A study
published in 2000 by Professor James S. Liebman and his Columbia Law
School colleagues examined 4578 state capital cases that were directly
reviewed on appeal in state appellate courts and 599 capital cases that
were reviewed in federal habeas corpus proceedings from 1973–95.55
They concluded that sixty-eight percent of the cases contained serious
error warranting reversal56 and catalogued numerous cases of
prosecutorial misconduct.57 They too noted the lack of prosecutorial
accountability.58
Similarly, a 1999 national study by the Chicago Tribune found that
since 1963, 381 homicide convictions have been reversed for serious
prosecutorial misconduct, including using false evidence or suppressing
exculpatory evidence.59 Of the 381 defendants, sixty-seven had been
sentenced to death.60 In describing the prosecutorial misconduct, the
reporters wrote: “They have prosecuted black men, hiding evidence the
real killers were white. They have prosecuted a wife, hiding evidence her
husband committed suicide. They have prosecuted parents, hiding
evidence their daughter was killed by wild dogs.”61 But, again, the study
found prosecutors were neither prosecuted nor disciplined for their
misconduct.62
State and local studies mirror the conclusions on a smaller scale. A
report on Illinois death penalty cases found that prosecutorial misconduct
accounted for twenty-one percent of all reversals.63 An Ohio study found
that in fourteen of the forty-eight cases in which the death penalty was
imposed some ethical issue involving the prosecutor had arisen.64 In
California, the Los Angeles County Grand Jury reported that from 1979–
90, “The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office failed to fulfill
the ethical responsibilities required of a public prosecutor by its

55. Liebman et al., supra note 42, at 1844.
56. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2052–54; Liebman et al., supra note 42, at 1850.
57. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2094–96 n.160; Liebman et al., supra note 42, at 1850.
58. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2121–22.
59. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1, Jan. 10, 1999.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Hartman & Richards, supra note 1, at 423.
64. Edward C. Brewer, III, Let’s Play Jeopardy: Where the Question Comes After the Answer
for Stopping Prosecutorial Misconduct in Death-Penalty Cases, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 34, 36 (2001).
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deliberate and informed declination to take the action necessary to curtail
the misuse of jail house informant testimony.”65
Unfortunately, these studies are but the latest of many reaching the
same conclusion.66 For example, in 1932, Professor Edwin Borchard of
Yale Law School published a book cataloguing sixty-five case studies of
wrongful convictions, including eight cases in which defendants were
convicted of murder but the alleged victim later turned out to be alive.67
A 1987 Stanford study found that since 1900, 350 innocent people were
convicted of potentially capital offenses.68 According to their analyses,
fifty of those wrongful convictions resulted at least in part from
prosecutorial misconduct, including suppression of exculpatory evidence
(thirty-five cases) and overzealous prosecution (fifteen cases).69
As consistent and convincing as these studies are, numbers alone
cannot convey the significance of the problem in human terms. For
example, in recent years in North Carolina, five death sentences were
reversed after prosecutorial misconduct was uncovered through the
state’s open-files process, which applies to habeas corpus actions for
prisoners on death row.70 In one case, the attorney general produced files
that contained statements from seventeen witnesses who had seen the
victim alive after the defendant was supposed to have killed him.71 In
65. REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY: INVESTIGATION OF THE
INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS ANGELES
COUNTY 6. The report catalogues inducements provided to informants in exchange for testimony. Id.
at 76–90. It explains that informants were encouraged to fabricate information and evidence because
they were never prosecuted for falsifying evidence, even though the fabrication was discovered. Id.
at 90. For example, informants were not prosecuted even after they testified to “diametrically
opposite facts in the same trial” and provided testimony that was “completely contrary to earlier
taped statements.” Id. In other cases, informants were promised that their cooperation would be
favorably reported if they provided “truthful” testimony. Id. at 95. As the Report observes, “[I]t is
only reasonable that ‘truthful’ to the informant means consistent with the prosecution’s theory of the
case. Otherwise, of course, there is no point in calling the informant as a witness.” Id. The Report
explains that the District Attorney’s Office failed to take corrective measures although evidence of
the abuses were known by the staff before it became publicly disclosed in a series of periodical
articles in 1987. Id. at 97–111. And even after the public disclosure, the Report concludes that the
management of the office failed to act in response to the abuses for more than a year. Id. at 111–22.
66. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 46–47.
67. Id. at 46 (summarizing EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE
ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE).
68. Id. at 45–47; Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Redelet, Miscarriages of Justice in
Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 23–24, apps. A–B (1987).
69. Bedau & Redelet, supra note 68, at 57.
70. Leonard Post, Open Files Key in Reversals: A Unique Discovery Statute Helps Death
Row Inmates Win New Trial, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 10, 2003, at 4.
71. Id.
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violation of the constitutional requirement established in Brady v.
Maryland,72 the prosecutors had withheld the statements from the
defendant’s trial and appellate counsel.73
Unfortunately, these are not isolated examples. An innocent Texas
man served thirteen years on death row as a result of what a federal judge
described as “outrageous” misconduct by the prosecutor, who failed to
disclose evidence that overwhelmingly pointed to another man as the
killer.74 In Louisiana, after fourteen years in prison, two innocent men
convicted of the same crime walked off death row after their lawyers
established serious prosecutorial misconduct.75 In California, two men
were wrongfully convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison
because prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence, including a
confession by another man, an eyewitness’s corroboration, and an
admission by a trial witness that she was lying about having seen the
murder.76 In 2004 they were found factually innocent after serving more
than thirteen years in prison.77 Another California man was convicted of
murder and served twenty-four years before being released when a
federal court determined that he had been wrongly convicted based on
the testimony of a jailhouse informant, a heroin user with a lengthy
criminal record.78 The prosecutors had struck a deal with the informant
to obtain his testimony but failed to inform defense counsel of the deal.79
In 1999, in Tulia, Texas, thirty-nine people—ten percent of the town’s
black population—were arrested on drug charges.80 Thirty-five of them
were convicted based on the false testimony of a former deputy sheriff

72. 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963) (holding that a prosecutor must divulge potentially
exculpatory evidence to the defendant).
73. Post, supra note 70, at 4.
74. Michael Yablonski, Section Volunteer Proves “Outrageous” Prosecutorial Misconduct
in Murder Trial, LITIG. NEWS, June–July 1995, at 1, 8.
75. Sara Rimer, Two Death-Row Inmates Exonerated in Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2001,
at A8. One of the men, Mr. Burrell, “who is retarded and cannot read or write, came within 17 days
of execution in 1996.” Id.
76. Bob Egelko, In Prison 13 Years for Murder, Freed Man Sues the City, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
14, 2004, at A21; Bob Egelko, Wrongfully Convicted of Murder, Man Sues, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 28,
2004, at B4; Joan Ryan, Innocent Man Freed with Luck, Good Lawyers, S.F. CHRON., May 5, 2004,
at B1.
77. Egelko, supra note 76.
78. Judge Dismisses Murder Case, Frees Man After 24 Years, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 3, 2004, at
B2.
79. Id.
80. Leonard Post, Trouble in Tulia Still Resounds, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 5, 2004, at 1.
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and the suppression of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor.81 Their
sentences ranged from eighteen to ninety years in prison,82 a combined
total of 750 years.83
The human consequences of wrongful convictions are tragic.
Imagine spending even one night on death row as an innocent person.
Imagine spending ten years in prison. Even after the wrongly convicted
are exonerated, the damage continues. The stigma of a prosecution and
conviction is lasting.84 Employment prospects are greatly diminished.85
As former Labor Secretary Ray Donovan asked his prosecutor after his
acquittal on criminal charges, “What office do I go to to get my
reputation back?”86 Of course, the wrongly accused defendant is not the
only one who suffers as a result of prosecutorial misconduct. Wrongful
prosecutions, convictions, and incarcerations ruin lives and destroy
families.87 The victim of the underlying crime and the victim’s family
are denied closure and justice.88 When the real perpetrators remain free,
other victims are exposed to future crimes and even death.89 In more
than one instance when an innocent defendant was wrongly convicted
and incarcerated for murder, the real murderer went on to commit other
murders.90
While prosecutorial misconduct occurs with alarming frequency,
safeguards and corrective measures have proven ineffective. Although
numerous procedural protections (including jury trials, appellate review,
and habeas corpus proceedings) are designed to protect the criminal
defendant’s rights, they neither prevent nor correct prosecutorial
misconduct. Moreover, other corrective measures including professional
discipline and criminal prosecution of misbehaving prosecutors are
almost never pursued. The following discussion will explain why each of

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Targeted in Tulia, Texas?, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/26/
60minutes/main575291.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
84. See Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 1297, 1305–07 (2000).
85. See id. at 1308–09.
86. Id. at 1307 (quoting George Lardner, Jr., Bronx Jury Acquits Donovan; Ex-Labor
Secretary, Codefendants Cleared of Larceny Charges, WASH. POST, May 25, 1987, at A1).
87. See id. at 1308.
88. Liebman et al., supra note 42, at 1864.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1864 n.81.
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these safeguards fails to adequately protect innocent defendants from
prosecutorial misconduct.
First, the trial process fails to protect the defendant against
prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, the same studies that catalogue
prosecutorial misconduct also document the ineffectiveness of defense
counsel in protecting the defendant’s rights.91 For example, a study of
Illinois death penalty cases concluded that prosecutorial misconduct was
responsible for twenty-one percent of reversals, while defense counsel
error accounted for nineteen percent of reversals.92 The ineffectiveness
of defense lawyers has been well documented, especially in death
penalty cases.93 Defense lawyers in capital cases are not adequately
paid94 and are not provided sufficient funds for investigations and
experts.95 Moreover, they have a disproportionately high record of
discipline and disbarment.96 The few attorneys willing to take on capital
cases are often “thoroughly incapable of mounting an effective defense
during either the guilt or punishment phases of the capital trial.”97
Trial judges also provide an insufficient check on prosecutorial
misconduct. As the thousands of appellate findings of prosecutorial
misconduct show, trial judges fail to protect the defendant from
misconduct.98 Even when the trial court catches the misconduct and has
the power to remedy the situation, the offending prosecutor is rarely

91. Liebman et al., supra note 42, at 1850 (stating that the two most common categories of
serious error were incompetent defense counsel (thirty-seven percent of reversals) and prosecutorial
misconduct (sixteen percent of reversals)); see also HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1; SCHECK ET AL.,
supra note 1.
92. Hartman & Richards, supra note 1, at 423.
93. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 2, at 2102–10; Kenneth Williams, Mid-Atlantic People of
Color Legal Scholarship Conference: The Death Penalty: Can It Be Fixed?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV.
1177, 1189–92 (2002).
94. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1853–55 (1994); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse
Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV.
329 (1995). In Massachusetts, private counsel appointed to represent indigents in criminal cases
receive thirty-five dollars an hour, which is raised to fifty-four dollars an hour for handling a murder
case. Leonard Post, Indigent Defense Services Blasted, NAT’L L.J., July 12, 2004, at 21.
95. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORY JUSTICE 1–2 (2001); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 398–99 (1995).
96. See Liebman, supra note 2, at 2102–10.
97. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 95, at 399.
98. See HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 108–09.
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identified publicly.99 This problem is exacerbated in states where judges
stand for election.100 As Professor Liebman explains, state judges and
the governors who appoint them run for office on high numbers of death
sentences and may lose reelection if capital trials result in acquittals or
life sentences.101
Second, appellate review is an inadequate check on prosecutorial
misconduct for several reasons. To begin with, prosecutorial misconduct
is rarely grounds for reversal of a conviction. Indeed, reversal is the
exception, not the rule.102 Under the harmless error standard, a defendant
must show not only that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, but also
that the misconduct had a substantial, prejudicial effect.103 For example,
when a defendant proves that a prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence, the defendant is not entitled to a reversal of the conviction
unless he also shows “that there is a reasonable probability that the
99. See United States v. Horn, 811 F. Supp. 739, 741 n.1 (D.N.H. 1992) (finding serious
prosecutorial misconduct but declining to name the offender because the court had been advised to
eliminate the name); Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 831 & n.448 (1999).
100. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2111–14.
101. Id. at 2112. Professor Liebman provides examples of statements by governors about
appointing death penalty proponents to the bench and of political attacks on judges who made
unpopular decisions in death penalty cases. For example, Tennessee Governor Don Sundquist
“proclaimed before a 1996 judicial election that he would appoint only death-penalty supporters to
be criminal-court judges.” Id. at 2112 n.197 (quoting Alan Berlow, Wrong Man, ATL. MONTHLY,
Nov. 1999, at 66, 80). California Governor Gray Davis reportedly told reporters “that voters elected
him based on public positions in favor of capital punishment and abortion rights . . . [and] expect his
[judicial] appointments to follow his political views: ‘My appointees . . . are not there to be
independent agents. They are there to reflect the sentiments that I expressed during the campaign.’”
Id. at 2113 n.197 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bart Jansen,
Davis: Judicial Picks Should Follow My Lead, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 1, 2000, at A4 (quoting
Gray Davis)). Professor Liebman also includes the example of the Tennessee Supreme Court justice
voted off the court principally due to a silent concurrence in a death penalty reversal. Liebman,
supra note 2, at 2113 (citing Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be
Done Amid Efforts To Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 308–12 (1997), and Stephen B. Bright et al., Breaking the Most Vulnerable
Branch: Do Rising Threats to Judicial Independence Preclude Due Process in Capital Cases, 31
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123 passim (1999)). Professor Liebman also refers to his own earlier
work, Liebman et al., supra note 1 (discussing whether political pressure on judges may lead to high
death sentencing rates), and also to the work of Bright and Keenan, Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J.
Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election
in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 760–61, 765 (1995) (providing numerous examples of judges
being removed from the bench because of their record in death penalty cases and of their
replacements’ notable inclination to impose and uphold capital convictions). Liebman, supra note 2,
at 2113.
102. See HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 108–09.
103. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 776 (1946).
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outcome of the trial would have been different had the evidence been
disclosed.”104 In other words, even when the defendant establishes
prosecutorial misconduct that may have influenced the conviction or
sentence, the conviction is affirmed under the harmless error standard.105
Thus, even when courts find prosecutorial misconduct, they generally
affirm the conviction or sentence. Recent empirical studies illustrate this
point. Specifically, the Center for Public Integrity studied 11,452 cases in
which prosecutorial misconduct was alleged.106 The appellate courts
granted relief in 2012 cases but found that the prosecutorial misconduct
amounted to harmless error in 8709 cases.107 Similarly, between 1993
and 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court and Illinois Appellate Courts found
167 instances of prosecutorial misconduct but affirmed 122 of the
convictions on the grounds that the misconduct was harmless.108
Even when the appellate court reverses a conviction on grounds of
prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor who engaged in the misconduct
generally escapes any repercussions. The consequence of a reversal is
that the defendant will be retried or have a new sentencing hearing. The
offending prosecutor is rarely identified by name.109 Moreover, the loss
on appeal is charged not to the original local prosecutor who committed
the misconduct, but to the unfortunate lawyer in the state attorney
general’s office who inherited the case for purposes of the appeal.110
Thus, the trial attorney who engaged in the misconduct often escapes

104. Gantt v. Roe, 389 F.3d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citing Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999)).
105. See, e.g., Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289–96 (finding harmless error where prosecutor failed to
disclose exculpatory evidence); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45–55 (1992) (holding
harmless error where prosecutor engaged in misconduct before the grand jury); Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178–82 (1986) (holding harmless error where prosecutor delivered
improper closing argument).
106. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, app. at 108–09.
107. Id.
108. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2128 n.239 (citing Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break
Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at N1); see also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438,
475 n.13 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (collecting authorities arguing
that the harmless error standard encourages prosecutorial misconduct and undermines the integrity of
the criminal justice process).
109. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2126; see also Henning, supra note 99, at 830–31 (describing
United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993), in which the Ninth Circuit found that the
Assistant United States Attorney engaged in extensive and persistent misconduct including lying to
the trial court; in the slip opinion remanding the case to determine whether it should be dismissed
due to the misconduct, the offending attorney was named, but the final opinion deleted the name).
But see Ruiz v. State, 743 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1999) (naming the prosecutor).
110. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2121.
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responsibility.111 Without meaningful trial or appellate court
consequences for misconduct, prosecutors may be sorely tempted to bend
the ethical and constitutional rules to obtain convictions since trial
success is essential to political success for elected prosecutors, and since
convictions are essential to favorable evaluations and promotions for
subordinate prosecutors.112
Even when a court is willing to publicly name the prosecutor, the
admonition seems to have no effect. For example, in 1999, the Florida
Supreme Court expressed its exasperation with the persistent
prosecutorial misconduct in death penalty cases that resulted in
reversals:113
In spite of our admonishment in [a prior case reversing a death penalty
conviction] and despite subsequent warnings that prosecutorial
misconduct will be subject to disciplinary proceedings of The Florida
Bar, we nevertheless continue to encounter this problem with
unacceptable frequency. The present case follows on the heels of
another misconduct case and is one of the worst examples we have
encountered.114

In addition to finding that the conduct at issue “crossed the line of
zealous advocacy by a wide margin and compromised the integrity of the
proceeding,”115 the court also cited six prior death penalty cases that it
had been compelled to reverse because of prosecutorial misconduct.116
Third, while it is difficult to correct prosecutorial misconduct in the
direct appeal, it is even more difficult on collateral review in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death

111. Id. at 2122–25. Indeed, Professor Liebman provides examples from the Chicago Tribune
report in which prosecutors were actually promoted despite scathing rebukes from the Illinois
Appellate Court for their misconduct. Id. at 2125 n.232 (citing Armstrong & Possley, supra note
108, at N1).
112. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 58 n.63 (1991).
113. Ruiz, 743 So. 2d at 9–10.
114. Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted).
115. Ruiz, 743 So. 2d at 8–10.
116. Id. (citing Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1998); Campbell v. State, 679 So. 2d 720
(Fla. 1996); King v. State, 623 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993); Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325, 1332 (Fla.
1993); Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346, 1356 (Fla. 1990); Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 359
(Fla. 1988)); see also Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1985) (finding that the
prosecutor’s misconduct was not “so outrageous as to taint the validity of the jury’s
recommendation” of death, but holding that the prosecutorial misconduct, despite prior admonitions,
warranted disciplinary proceedings).
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Penalty Act (AEDPA) set strict time limits in habeas proceedings.117
Under AEDPA, federal courts must be deferential to state court
convictions.118 Thus, federal judges have found that they are powerless
to grant relief even when they find credible evidence of actual
innocence.119 In one case, the defendant was convicted based on the
testimony of two eyewitnesses.120 One recanted and admitted perjury,
and the other’s testimony was challenged by an associate who said it was
physically impossible for the witness to have seen the crime.121 As the
court explained its inability to grant relief:
One cannot read the record in this case without developing a nagging
suspicion that the wrong man may have been convicted of capital
murder and armed criminal action in a Missouri courtroom. . . . A
layperson would have little trouble concluding Burton should be
permitted to present his evidence of innocence in some forum.
Unfortunately, Burton’s claims and evidence run headlong into the
thicket of impediments erected by courts and by Congress. Burton’s
legal claims permit him no relief, even as the facts suggest he may well
be innocent.122

In other words, since AEDPA review is so restricted, it is not an effective
procedure for correcting prosecutorial misconduct.
Fourth, just as the adversary process fails to prevent or correct
prosecutorial misconduct, disciplinary proceedings are also inadequate to
address the problem because they are rarely instituted against
prosecutors.123 Specifically, the report by the Center for Public Integrity

117. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 39. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) provides that prisoners in
state custody must file habeas petitions within one year of certain triggering events, in most cases the
date the state conviction became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides parallel deadlines for prisoners in
federal custody.
118. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 39. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), a federal court must
assume that a state court finding of fact is correct and can only reject the finding based on clear and
convincing evidence of error.
119. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 40–41.
120. Id. at 40.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2121 n.227 (citing Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row
Justice Derailed, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at N1); Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and
Stare Decisis: The Present Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to Its Absolute
Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1135, 1184–89 (1996); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:
Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
851, 898–900 (1995); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 718–31 (1987); Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical
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found that since 1970 there were more than 2000 cases of prosecutorial
misconduct requiring appellate correction for harmful error.124 But there
were only forty-four instances in which disciplinary action was taken and
only two disbarments. Another study apparently found that from 1886 to
2000 there were only 100 cases of disciplinary proceedings against
prosecutors, less than one per year across the entire country.125 And
although the Chicago Tribune study found 381 reversed convictions
resulting from prosecutorial misconduct in suppressing exculpatory
evidence and introducing false evidence, it found not a single instance in
which the prosecutor received a public sanction.126
And finally, while in theory prosecutors could be criminally
prosecuted for their misconduct, in fact they almost never are.127
Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 242 provides criminal liability for government
officials who violate constitutional protections.128 But since § 242 was
adopted in 1866,129 research discloses only one conviction of a
prosecutor under this statute.130 Indeed, although the Supreme Court
cited § 242 as a basis for criminally prosecuting prosecutors who engage
Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 966–67 (1984); Joseph R. Weeks, No
Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors To Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 881–96 (1997); Williams, supra note 3, at
3441; see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, at 181.
124. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at i.
125. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Discipline of Prosecutors: A Response to Professor
Zacharias, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 121, 124 (2001) (discussing Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional
Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001)).
126. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1.
127. Liebman, supra note 2, at 2122.
128. Section 242 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1996).
129. Section 242 was originally adopted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It was
readopted after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment as part of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act. See
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180–85 (1961); see also Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and
Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 5, 7 (1985).
130. Brophy v. Comm. on Prof’l Standards, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Rosen,
supra note 123, at 703 n.56, 726; Weeks, supra note 123, at 878–79 n.259. Somewhat ironically, the
criminal conviction was treated as a mitigating factor in the state disciplinary proceeding. Brophy,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 819. One other case involved an attorney who wrongfully invoked the criminal
process to extract money from the defendant, but it is not clear whether the attorney was a public
official. See In re Anderson, 177 S.E.2d 130 (S.C. 1970).
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in misconduct, the Court cited no case in which this has actually
happened.131
In short, prosecutorial misconduct is alarmingly common, and there
is no corrective mechanism, no accountability, no effective deterrent,
and—because of prosecutorial immunities—often no civil remedy. As
one commentator observed, the arguments supporting absolute
prosecutorial immunity “offer a wry blend of fairy tale and horror
story.”132
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO § 1983 LIABILITY AND COMMONLAW IMMUNITIES
As this section will show, the Court has developed a functional
approach to the application of common-law immunities in § 1983
actions.133 Depending on the function being performed, a government
officer is either entitled to absolute or qualified immunity.134 Absolute
immunity shields the officer from liability even though she acted in bad
faith and with malice.135 Qualified immunity, on the other hand, protects
the officer unless she violated clearly established law of which a
reasonable officer would have known.136 The following section explains
this development. It first outlines the significance of § 1983 liability in
civil rights enforcement and then traces the Court’s early analysis of the
application of common-law immunities in § 1983 litigation.
A. Section 1983
Until the Civil War, the constitutional protections of the Bill of
Rights applied only to the federal government, not to the states.137 At the
close of the Civil War, Congress adopted the Thirteenth Amendment,
which outlawed slavery and essentially transformed the Emancipation
Proclamation into a constitutional right.138 But the Thirteenth
131. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
132. R.J. Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV. 303, 339 (1959).
133. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); see also 2 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 7:2 (2003); 1 STEVEN H.
STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 15:2 (2002).
134. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807–08 (1982); 1
STEINGLASS, supra note 133, § 15:3.
135. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 (1997); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
136. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; 1 STEINGLASS, supra note 133, § 15:7.
137. Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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Amendment failed to adequately protect the rights and safety of the
newly freed slaves, and a reign of violence took hold in the South.139 In
response, Congress adopted the first Reconstruction civil rights statute,
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.140 In part because it doubted the
constitutional authority for this statute,141 in 1868 Congress adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment, which requires states to provide citizens due
process and equal protection of the law.142 In 1871, buttressed by the
constitutional authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
essentially readopted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which is codified
today as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.143 As Justice Blackmun has explained,
“Taken collectively, the Reconstruction Amendments, the Civil Rights
Acts, and these new jurisdictional statutes, all emerging from the caldron
of the War Between the States, marked a revolutionary shift in the
relationship among individuals, the States, and the Federal
Government.”144
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .145

For nearly 100 years, § 1983 remained essentially dormant.146 But in
1961, the Court held in Monroe v. Pape.147 that § 1983 applied when
139. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 174–79 (1961).
140. Blackmun, supra note 129, at 4–5; Jacques L. Schillaci, Unexamined Premises: Toward
Doctrinal Purity in Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 447
(2002).
141. Blackmun, supra note 129, at 6–8.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 1:3 (2004); Blackmun, supra note 129, at 4–5; Schillaci, supra note 140,
at 447.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was originally enacted as section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
17 Stat. 13, which was essentially a reenactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See Monroe, 365
U.S. at 167, 171, 185; see also 1 NAHMOD, supra note 133, § 1:3 (explaining that § 1983 was
patterned after the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
144. Blackmun, supra note 129, at 6.
145. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2004).
146. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968); see also HAROLD S. LEWIS,
JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (2001); Blackmun, supra note
129, at 19–20.
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police officers violated a person’s civil rights by an abuse of their official
office, despite the availability of a state remedy. Since Monroe, § 1983
has been the major remedy for civil rights violations by state and local
officials.148 It provides the primary enforcement mechanism for many
statutory provisions as well as constitutional guarantees.149 In addition,
despite the absence of statutory authority, the Court adopted a
companion remedy for redressing violations by federal officials in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.150
The frequent use of these two civil rights remedies has not been without
controversy.151 But given their lengthy and well-established
jurisprudence, it seems highly unlikely that the Court will return to an
interpretation of § 1983 and Bivens that significantly diminishes their
role in civil rights enforcement.
B. Common-Law Immunities in § 1983 Actions
As § 1983 and Bivens actions came into frequent use, the Court faced
the question of whether immunity defenses would be available to
officials sued for civil rights violations.152 Nothing in the language of §
1983 suggests that Congress intended to extend official immunity
defenses to defendants in civil rights actions, and the legislative history

147. 365 U.S. 167, 185–91 (1961).
148. See David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Interpretive Approach and the
Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 497 (1992).
149. KAREN M. BLUM & KATHRYN R. URBONYA, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 43 (1998).
150. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). For purposes of the immunity defenses, the Court treats § 1983
and Bivens actions the same. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 n.2 (1986) (“[I]t is untenable
to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
151. Compare Blackmun, supra note 129, at 1 (arguing that § 1983 was an important vehicle
for maintaining a federal forum for the protection of federal rights), and James K. Park, The
Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (2003) (arguing
that monetary remedies for constitutional torts serve not only the goals of compensation and
deterrence, but also provide individual remedies that help spur the development of constitutional
rights, norms that regulate government action, and structural solutions to systemic problems), with
John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999)
(arguing that courts interpret constitutional rights narrowly in order to reduce government exposure
to money damages), and Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000) (arguing that constitutional torts
have a limited deterrent effect and are not economically justified).
152. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (executive immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judicial
immunity).
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does not demonstrate that Congress intended to preserve immunities.153
Indeed, since the whole goal of the statute was to impose liability on
state officials who violated constitutional rights, it seems doubtful that
Congress intended to insulate officials who were violating civil rights by
granting them immunity.154
According to the Court, however, the 1871 Congress presumably
acted against the backdrop of the established common-law immunities of
the time.155 In the Court’s view, if Congress had intended to effect such
a momentous change in the law as to eliminate common-law immunities,
that would be clear from the legislative history.156 Since the legislative
record does not affirmatively support this intent, the Court inferred from
the congressional silence that Congress intended to retain the commonlaw immunities.157 For this reason, the starting point for analyzing
immunity defenses under § 1983 is the relevant common law as it existed
in 1871 when § 1983 was adopted.
The Court first held that common-law immunities applied in § 1983
actions in Tenney v. Brandhove.158 In Tenney, members of the UnAmerican Activities Committee of the California Senate were sued for
violating the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.159 The Court held that
the legislators were protected by legislative immunity, which was
reflected in English common law and the Speech or Debate Clause of the
federal and state constitutions.160 As Justice Frankfurter explained,
quoting a member of the constitutional Committee of Detail,
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably
necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he
should be protected from the resentment of every one, however

153. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 559–60 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341
U.S. 367, 382–83 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Achtenberg, supra note 148, at 502–11; Note,
Liability of Judicial Officers Under § 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 325–28 (1969).
154. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 559–60 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 382–83
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Achtenberg, supra note 148, at 502–11; Note, supra note 153, at 325–28.
155. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–85; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356 (1978); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
156. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–85; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356;
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
157. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–85; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356;
Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
158. 341 U.S. 367.
159. Id. at 370–71.
160. Id. at 372–73.

74

2JOH-FIN

53]

5/11/2005 11:42:54 AM

Prosecutorial Immunity
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion
offence.161

The Court concluded that this historical immunity survived the passage
of § 1983, explaining, “We cannot believe that Congress—itself a
staunch advocate of legislative freedom—would impinge on a tradition
so well grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general
language [of § 1983].”162
While the Court held that legislative immunity applied in § 1983
actions, it limited its application to conduct within the legislative
function that the immunity was designed to protect.163 To protect the
legislative function, the Court has applied legislative immunity to
nonlegislators when they are performing legislative functions.164 But for
acts to be covered, they must be an integral part of the legislative
process;165 legislative immunity does not apply to activities outside the
legislative function.166
After recognizing absolute legislative immunity, the Court next
addressed the issue of judicial immunity in § 1983 actions.167 In Pierson
v. Ray,168 the Court held that judges were also entitled to absolute
immunity from liability under § 1983. In the Court’s view, “Few
doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the
immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within
their judicial jurisdiction.”169 This well-established doctrine was not
intended to be abolished by the adoption of § 1983.170 Under this
doctrine, judges of courts of general jurisdiction “are not liable to civil
actions for their judicial acts, even where such acts are in excess of their
161. Id. at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 38
(Andrews ed. 1896)).
162. Id. at 376.
163. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972); BLUM & URBONYA, supra note 149,
at 72–73; 2 NAHMOD, supra note 133, § 7:4.
164. Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 733–34 (1980) (holding that state
supreme court justices receive legislative immunity when adopting the state bar code because this is
a legislative function).
165. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625; 2 NAHMOD, supra note 133, at § 7:4.
166. For example, legislative immunity does not protect a legislator engaged in private
publishing through a commercial publisher nor for personnel decisions regarding his staff. See
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), explained in Forrester v. White,
484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); 2 NAHMOD, supra note 133, at § 7:4.
167. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
168. 386 U.S. at 553–54.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 554–555; Forrester, 484 U.S. at 225.
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jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or
corruptly.”171 As the Court has explained, the policy underlying the
immunity was “for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the
judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence
and without fear of consequences.”172 As with absolute legislative
immunity, absolute judicial immunity is confined to the function it is
intended to protect.173
In contrast to the absolute immunity afforded legislators and judges,
executive officers—from police officers to governors—receive only
qualified immunity.174 As the Court explained in rejecting a claim for
absolute executive immunity, the common law never granted police
officers absolute immunity but rather afforded them qualified immunity
so long as they acted reasonably and in good faith.175 This same
qualified immunity, according to the Court, applied as well to high-level
executive officers.176 In refusing to extend absolute immunity to police
officers, the Court emphasized that its “role is to interpret the intent of
Congress in enacting § 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice . .
. . Since the statute on its face does not provide for any immunities, we
would be going far to read into it an absolute immunity for conduct
which was only accorded qualified immunity in 1871.”177
Moreover, qualified immunity is presumed to provide the appropriate
balance between protecting government functions and compensating
victims of misconduct.178 In the Court’s view, qualified immunity
attempts to “balance between the evils inevitable in any available
alternative.”179 It offers victims a remedy for egregious abuses of office
while protecting honest officials from excessive exposure to liability and
tempering the attendant social costs of litigation, diversion of official
energy, and deterrence of citizens from accepting public office.180 The
171. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; Stump, 435 U.S. at 355–56.
172. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 226–27.
173. For example, a judge is not entitled to absolute immunity for the unconstitutional
discharge of a court employee since that act is administrative in nature and therefore outside the
scope of absolute judicial immunity. See id. at 224, 227–29; 2 NAHMOD, supra note 133, § 7:15.
174. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 245 (1974).
175. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 245.
176. Id. at 246–49.
178. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986); see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492–
94 (1990); Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920–21 (1984).
178. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see also Burns, 500 U.S. at 486–87.
179. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–14.
180. Id. at 814.
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Court has repeatedly held that the official seeking absolute immunity has
the burden of showing that it is justified, and that qualified rather than
absolute immunity is presumed to provide sufficient protection to
government officials.181
Over time, however, the Court became dissatisfied with the goodfaith test for qualified immunity and developed a new, purely objective
test. As the Court explained, “substantial costs attend the litigation of the
subjective good faith of government officials.”182 Specifically, the Court
found that subjective inquiries entail a consideration of the actor’s
experiences, values, and emotions and thus can rarely be decided by
summary judgment.183 The subjective test leads to broad-ranging
discovery, which “can be peculiarly disruptive of effective
government.”184 The immunity defenses are intended to shield officials
not only from the burden of liability, but also from the burden of
litigation.185 So, to better achieve the proper balance, the court adopted
an objective standard whereby “government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”186
As this summary shows, the Court has developed a functional
approach to immunity defenses available in § 1983 actions. For essential
government functions needing special protection, the Court applies
181. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486–87 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)); Malley,
475 U.S. at 340; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978).
182. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 817.
185. Id. at 815–18.
186. Id. at 818. The Court has refined this objective standard. As the Court explained in
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), the right must be established not in a vague and
abstract sense, but
in a more particularized, and hence more relevant sense: The contours of the right must
be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right. This is not to say that an official is protected by qualified immunity
unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that
in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.
Id. The most recent case addressing the qualified immunity test, Hope v. Peltzer, 536 U.S. 730
(2002), held that novel facts did not preclude finding that the officer had violated clearly established
law of which a reasonable officer would have known. In Hope, the officer had handcuffed the
plaintiff to a hitching post for several hours in the hot sun without water or bathroom breaks. Id. at
733–35. The Court held that although there were no prior reported cases with similar facts, the
wanton infliction of pain violated clearly established law. Id. at 741–46.
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absolute immunity.187 Absolute immunity is rarely granted and is
reserved for critical government functions where the defendant
establishes both a common-law basis for the immunity and a public
policy need for it.188 Qualified immunity, on the other hand, is presumed
to be the applicable immunity and to afford sufficient protection to
government functions.189 This immunity attempts to balance the need to
protect the official function from undue liability against the need to
protect civil rights, compensate victims, and deter official misconduct.190
The following sections discuss the application of these immunity
defenses in § 1983 actions for prosecutorial misconduct.
IV. THE CURRENT LAW
A. The Supreme Court’s Functional Approach to
Prosecutorial Immunity
As the Court developed its functional immunity doctrine, it decided a
series of cases determining the appropriate level of immunity for
prosecutors in § 1983 actions.191 Specifically, the Court has held that
prosecutors who act as advocates are protected by absolute immunity
while prosecutors who act as administrators or investigators are protected
by qualified immunity.192 This Section will summarize the Court’s
187. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
486–87 (1990).
188. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–87.
189. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486–87; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813–14.
190. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486–87; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807, 813–14.
191. See Anne H. Burkett, Kalina v. Fletcher: Another Qualification of Imbler’s Prosecutorial
Immunity Doctrine, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867 (1999); Erwin Chemerinsky, Prosecutorial
Immunity—The Interpretation Continues, TRIAL, Mar. 1998, at 80; McNamara, supra note 123;
Brian P. Barrow, Note, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: Tradition Pays a Price for the Reduction of
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 301 (1995); Jeffrey J. McKenna, Note,
Prosecutorial Immunity: Imbler, Burns, and Now Buckley v. Fitzsimmons—The Supreme Court’s
Attempt To Provide Guidance in a Difficult Area, 1994 BYU L. REV. 663; Deborah S. Platz, Note,
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: The Beginning of the End for Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 18 NOVA
L. REV. 1919 (1994); Megan M. Rose, Note, The Endurance of Prosecutorial Immunity—How the
Federal Courts Vitiated Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1019 (1996).
192. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269–70; Burns, 500 U.S. at
487–96. Under the functional approach, prosecutorial immunities apply not only to prosecutors, but
also to other officials performing prosecutorial functions. Erwin Chemerinsky, Prosecutorial
Immunity, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1643, 1644 (1999). Thus, social workers who are functioning as
prosecutors have been protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id. at 1645 (citing Ernst v.
Children & Family Servs., 108 F.3d 486 (3d Cir. 1997); Thompson v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc.,
85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1996)). As Professor Chemerinsky points out, other cases have afforded
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development of these prosecutorial immunities in four cases: Imbler v.
Pachtman,193 Burns v. Reed,194 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,195 and Kalina v.
Fletcher.196 As this line of cases shows, the Court has attempted to
provide some guidance for determining whether a prosecutor was acting
as an advocate entitled to absolute immunity or an administrator or
investigator entitled to qualified immunity. The margins, however, are
blurry and indistinct.
1. Imbler v. Pachtman
In the landmark case of Imbler v. Pachtman, the Court held that
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity under § 1983.197 Imbler
was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death following a trial
in which the prosecutor knowingly used false evidence and suppressed
exculpatory evidence.198 Freed by a writ of habeas corpus after serving
nine years in prison,199 Imbler sued the prosecutor for money damages
under § 1983.200 The action was dismissed based on absolute
immunity,201 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
question of prosecutorial immunity.202
As the Court had previously concluded in cases involving legislators
and judges, § 1983 should “be read in harmony with general principles of
tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.”203
Presented with its first opportunity to address the immunity of a state
prosecutor in a § 1983 action, the Court began by exploring “the
immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and
the interests behind it.”204 The Court found that the historical immunity

social workers only qualified immunity. Id. at 1645 (citing White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731 (4th
Cir. 1997); Defore v. Premore, 86 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1996)).
193. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
194. 500 U.S. 478 (1990).
195. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
196. 522 U.S. 118 (1997).
197. 424 U.S. at 427.
198. Id. at 412–13. After the trial, when Pachtman discovered additional evidence
corroborating Imbler’s alibi defense, he wrote to the Governor of California to advise him of the new
evidence. Id. at 412.
199. Id. at 414–15.
200. Id. at 415–16.
201. Id. at 416.
202. Id. at 417.
203. Id. at 418.
204. Id. at 421.
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of prosecutors was grounded on the same policies as the immunities of
judges and grand jurors.205 “These include concern that harassment by
unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s
energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade
his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment
required by his public trust.”206
Finding the common-law rule of absolute prosecutorial immunity to
be “well settled,”207 the Court concluded that public policy supported the
continuance of the doctrine under § 1983 because the threat of civil
liability would undermine prosecutorial performance and constrain
independent decisionmaking.208 The Court anticipated that actions
against prosecutors “could be expected with some frequency, for a
defendant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into
the ascription of improper and malicious actions to the State’s
advocate.”209 In the Court’s view, the potential flood of civil litigation
would divert energy, attention, and resources from the performance of
prosecutorial functions.210 Moreover, as the Court explained, even
honest prosecutors make mistakes under the constraints of limited time
and information.211 Immunity permits prosecutors to exercise their
discretion without fear that they will be held civilly liable, a fear that
could lead them to withhold relevant and credible evidence lest it might
turn out to be false.212 Thus, to the Court, absolute immunity was
necessary because exposure to civil liability would undermine the
prosecutorial function and in turn the criminal justice system.213
In the Court’s analysis, the burden and distraction of imposing civil
liability was unwarranted because other corrective mechanisms would
safeguard the accused’s rights. The Court listed “the remedial powers of
the trial judge, appellate review, and state and federal post-conviction

205. Id. at 422–23.
206. Id. at 423.
207. Id. at 424; see also id. at 424 n.21 (citing authorities to support this “well settled” rule,
the earliest of which was Anderson v. Rohrer, 3 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Fla. 1933)). But see infra Part
V.A (discussing the absence of historical support for the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial
immunity).
208. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–28.
209. Id. at 425.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 425–26.
213. Id. at 426.
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collateral remedies.”214 The Court also suggested that prosecutors could
be subject to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal
analogue to § 1983, as well as professional discipline.215 The Court
acknowledged that its ruling left the “genuinely wronged defendant
without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest
action deprives him of liberty.”216 But it concluded that in this instance it
is “‘better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation.’”217
2. Burns v. Reed
Fifteen years later, the Court refined the scope of absolute
prosecutorial immunity in Burns v. Reed.218 In Burns, a mother reported
that her two sons had been shot by an unknown assailant.219 When the
police concluded that she was the chief suspect, the prosecutor wrongly
advised them that they could seek a confession from the mother while
she was hypnotized.220 The prosecutor then used that confession to
establish probable cause for her arrest.221 When these facts were
revealed, the trial judge ordered the “confession” suppressed and the
prosecutor dropped all charges.222 Burns brought a § 1983 action for
damages against the prosecutor.223 The action was dismissed on the
ground of absolute immunity.224 The Court granted certiorari to clarify
the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity.225
The Court noted that in Imbler it had held that absolute immunity
covered the initiation and presentation of the State’s case insofar as that
conduct was “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process” but had declined to consider whether that immunity
would extend to a prosecutor’s conduct as an administrator or

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 427.
Id. at 428–429.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 428 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
500 U.S. 478 (1990).
Id. at 481.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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investigator as opposed to conduct as an advocate.226 As the Court
observed, under the functional approach, “the official seeking absolute
immunity bears the burden of showing that [it] is justified” and must
overcome the presumption that qualified rather than absolute immunity is
sufficient to protect government functions.227
The Court then turned to the question of whether absolute immunity
should be extended to Reed’s participation in the probable cause hearing
and provision of legal advice to the police. The Court concluded that
Reed was entitled to absolute immunity from liability for participating in
the probable cause hearing228 but only entitled to qualified immunity for
providing legal advice to the police.229
In addressing the argument that Reed was liable for eliciting
misleading testimony in the probable cause hearing, the Court first
examined the common-law immunity for testimony in judicial
proceedings. It found that witnesses, prosecutors, and other lawyers were
absolutely immune from liability at common law for making false or
defamatory statements and also for eliciting false and defamatory
testimony.230 Justice White observed that in appearing before a judge
and presenting evidence, the prosecutor was clearly acting in his role as
an advocate, not as an investigator or administrator,231 and that this
conduct was “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process.”232 As before, the Court expressed confidence that
“[t]he safeguards built into the judicial system tend to reduce the need for
private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional
conduct.”233
Turning to the prosecutor’s conduct in providing legal advice to the
police, the Court found no common-law support for extending absolute
immunity to this activity234 and no policy reason to justify it.235 The
226. Id. at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
430 (1976)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 487.
229. Id. at 495–96.
230. Id. at 489–90.
231. Id. at 491.
232. Id. at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
430 (1976)).
233. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512
(1978)).
234. Id. at 492–94.
235. Id at 494–96.
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Court emphasized that since § 1983 does not provide for any immunities,
the Court would exceed its proper role in affording absolute immunity to
conduct that was only accorded qualified immunity in 1871 when the
statute was adopted.236 The Court noted that absolute immunity for legal
advice was not necessary to protect prosecutors from vexatious litigation
since suspects will rarely know advice was given.237
Moreover, the Court stated that this conduct is not intimately
connected to the judicial process, which is the function prosecutorial
immunity is designed to protect.238 As Justice White explained,
“Absolute immunity is designed to free the judicial process from the
harassment and intimidation associated with litigation. That concern
therefore justifies absolute prosecutorial immunity only for actions that
are connected with the prosecutor’s role in judicial proceedings, not for
every litigation-inducing conduct.”239 The Court stressed that the current
qualified immunity defense is more protective than when Imbler was
decided and now “provides ample protection to all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”240 Finally, the
Court concluded that the other checks on unconstitutional misconduct,
most importantly the protections afforded through the judicial process,
will not effectively restrain out-of-court prosecutorial misconduct. 241
3. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons
The Court returned to the scope of absolute prosecutorial immunity
in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.242 In Buckley, the question was whether
absolute immunity protected prosecutors who conspired with police to
fabricate evidence during the preliminary investigation of a highly
publicized rape and murder.243 Specifically, the prosecutors retained an
expert witness known for her willingness to fabricate evidence and who
provided the entire basis for the prosecution by falsely connecting the

236. Id. at 494.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. (citation omitted).
240. Id. at 494–95 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)). Since the Imbler decision, the Court had rejected the common-law good-faith standard
for qualified immunity and adopted an objective standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
815–18 (1982). See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text.
241. Burns, 500 U.S. at 496.
242. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
243. Id. at 261–64.
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defendant’s boots to the crime scene.244 The lower courts found that
absolute immunity applied,245 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to refine the scope of prosecutorial immunity.246
The Court explained that, under the functional approach, absolute
immunity shields adversary functions such as initiating judicial
proceedings, evaluating evidence, and preparing presentations before a
grand jury or trial.247 But “the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely
immune merely because they are performed by a prosecutor.”248 Rather,
the issue turns on the function the prosecutor was performing.249 The
Court distinguished between the tasks performed by an advocate in
preparing for trial and those of a detective investigating a crime to
establish probable cause to arrest a suspect.250 As the Court concluded,
“[w]hen a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally
performed by a detective or police officer, it is ‘neither appropriate nor
justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not
the other.’”251
The Court then considered whether the prosecutors had met the
burden of establishing that they were functioning as advocates when
fabricating evidence that the boot print on the victim’s door had been
made by Buckley’s boot.252 This conduct had occurred before the
prosecutors had probable cause to arrest Buckley and before the grand
jury investigation.253 As the Court concluded, “[The defendants’]
mission at that time was entirely investigative in character. A prosecutor
neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has

244. Id. at 262–63. The plaintiff also alleged that false statements at a press conference
violated her civil rights. Id. at 261, 276. The Court held that qualified immunity applied to press
conference statements for three reasons. First, there was no historical basis for applying absolute
immunity since out-of-court statements by attorneys were not protected by the common law in 1871
when § 1983 was adopted because such statements were not functionally connected to the judicial
process. Id. at 277. Second, the Court has no license to extend absolute immunity beyond its 1871
scope. Id. at 278. And third, qualified immunity is presumed to provide sufficient protection to
government functions. Id.
245. Id. at 265.
246. Id. at 267.
247. Id. at 272–73.
248. Id. at 273.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)).
252. Id. at 274.
253. Id.
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probable cause to have anyone arrested.”254 The Court emphatically
rejected the contention that a prosecutor may shield his investigative
misconduct by presenting fabricated evidence to a grand jury or
introducing it at trial because “every prosecutor might then shield
himself from liability for any constitutional wrong against innocent
citizens by ensuring that they go to trial.”255 The Court acknowledged
that after probable cause is met, the prosecutor is not necessarily entitled
to absolute immunity. As the Court explained, “Even after that
determination . . . a prosecutor may engage in ‘police investigative work’
that is entitled to only qualified immunity.”256
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennedy pointed
out the difficulties that the majority’s approach would create for the
lower courts.257 In his view, drawing a line between advocatory and
investigatory functions requires “difficult and subtle distinctions” that are
not clarified by the adoption of a probable cause requirement.258 To
Justice Kennedy, the Court’s attempt to establish a “bright-line
standard”259 “has created more problems than it has solved.”260 As will
be discussed in Part IV.B, the application of the probable cause rule and
the characterization of post-probable cause conduct have indeed proven
troublesome to the lower courts.
4. Kalina v. Fletcher
The Court’s most recent decision on the scope of absolute
prosecutorial immunity is Kalina v. Fletcher.261 In Kalina, the question
posed was whether absolute immunity applied when a prosecutor made
false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an
arrest warrant.262 The prosecutor had initiated criminal proceedings by
filing three documents: (1) an unsworn information charging the
defendant with burglary; (2) an unsworn motion for the warrant; and (3)
a certification summarizing the evidence supporting the charges, which

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 274 n.5.
Id. at 286–91 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 290 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 286 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 290 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
522 U.S. 118 (1997).
Id. at 120.
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was executed by the prosecutor under penalty of perjury.263 The third
document, the certification (which implicated the suspect in the crime),
was factually inaccurate in several respects.264 Based on these
documents, the trial court found probable cause and issued the arrest
warrant.265 After the charges were dismissed on the prosecutor’s
motion,266 the plaintiff sued the prosecutor for damages under § 1983.267
The District Court denied the prosecutor’s motion for summary judgment
on the basis of absolute immunity268 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.269
In light of a conflict in the circuit courts on this question, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.270
Applying its functional immunity doctrine, the Court held that the
prosecutor’s conduct in preparing the three documents was protected by
absolute immunity because they were prepared as part of an advocate’s
function.271 But the critical question was “whether she was acting as a
complaining witness rather than a lawyer when she executed the
certification ‘[u]nder penalty of perjury.’”272 As the Court had
previously held, complaining witnesses are not entitled to immunity.273
The Court concluded that the prosecutor was acting as a complaining
witness, not an advocate, and therefore was not entitled to absolute

263. Id. at 120–21.
264. Id. at 121.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 122.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Fletcher v. Kalina, 93 F.3d 653 (9th Cir.1996).
270. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since a police officer would
receive qualified immunity for false statements in an application for an arrest warrant under Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), a prosecutor should receive the same immunity for the same
conduct. Fletcher, 93 F.3d at 655–56. But the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Sixth Circuit had
reached a different conclusion in Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 1986). As the
Supreme Court explained, “Because we have never squarely addressed the question whether a
prosecutor may be held liable for conduct in obtaining an arrest warrant, we granted certiorari to
resolve the conflict.” Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123.
271. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129.
272. Id.
273. Malley, 475 U.S. at 335 (holding that a police officer only received qualified immunity
for signing an affidavit in connection with an arrest warrant secured without probable cause). As the
Court explained, complaining witnesses did not receive absolute immunity at common law. Id. at
340–41. This function is distinguished from that of a witness during the judicial phase of the
proceeding. Id. at 341–43; see also infra Part V.A (discussing absolute witness immunity at common
law).
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immunity for signing the false certification under penalty of perjury.274
As the Court explained, the ethics of the legal profession counsel that
advocates should not put their own credibility in issue.275 And while the
prosecutor acting as an advocate could properly claim absolute immunity
for evaluating the strength of the evidence to support the warrant and for
determining which facts to include in the certification, “[t]estifying about
facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer.”276
In summary, the Court has relied on the common law of 1871 and
various policy considerations in developing its prosecutorial immunity
doctrine.277 It has afforded prosecutors either qualified or absolute
immunity depending on the function they were performing at the time of
the misconduct.278 Under the Court’s functional approach, when
prosecutors act as administrators, investigators, or witnesses, qualified
immunity applies.279 But when they act as advocates performing
functions intimately connected with the judicial phase of the criminal
proceeding, absolute immunity applies.280 In determining whether a
prosecutor is acting as an investigator or advocate, the Court has held
that before probable cause is established, a prosecutor functions as an
investigator.281 After probable cause is established, a prosecutor may be
acting as either an investigator or an advocate, depending on the function
being performed.282 But, as the following discussion shows, the Court’s
functional approach and probable cause requirement have produced
conflicts and confusion in the lower courts and have generated subjective
state-of-mind inquiries which preclude the early resolution of the
litigation.
B. Conflicts in the Lower Courts
The Court’s functional approach to prosecutorial immunity has
created conflicts and confusion as the lower courts attempt to grapple
with the difficulty of characterizing prosecutorial misconduct and
274. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130–31.
275. Id. at 130.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 123–27; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484–85, 489–90; Imbler,
424 U.S. at 422–24.
278. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125–27; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69; Burns, 500 U.S. at 485–86.
279. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 125–26; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269–70.
280. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129–31; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 270–71; Burns, 500 U.S. at 486.
281. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.
282. Id. at 274 n.5.
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determining which immunity applies. Specifically, the circuit court
decisions conflict: (1) on whether the criminal defendant’s due process
rights are violated when a prosecutor coerces a witness to testify falsely;
(2) on whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity when she
fabricates evidence or coerces a witness to testify falsely and then uses
that tainted evidence in a judicial proceeding; (3) on the application of
the Buckley probable cause requirement; and (4) on how to determine
whether a prosecutor is acting as an investigator or advocate when she
engages in misconduct after probable cause has been met.
While the lower courts have been vexed with confusion about
absolute prosecutorial immunity for many years, since 2003 this
uncertainty has become increasingly problematic. Specifically, circuit
courts have recently adopted subjective standards to determine whether
the Buckley probable cause requirement has been met283 and whether the
prosecutor was functioning as an advocate or an investigator after
probable cause was met.284 The introduction of these subjective inquiries
undermines the goal of providing a defense that can be resolved at the
earliest stages of the litigation.285 As the following discussion will show,
the confusion that the absolute immunity doctrine has generated supports
the argument that the doctrine itself should be reconsidered.
1. Due process rights and prosecutorial coercion of witnesses
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,286 the plaintiff alleged that prosecutors
violated his rights under the Due Process Clause by extracting
incriminating statements from witnesses by coercing these witnesses and
paying them money. The Court declined to rule on the due process claim
because “the contours of [these] claims [were] unclear, and they were not
addressed below.”287 In the decade since the Buckley decision, the circuit
courts have split on the question of whether prosecutorial coercion of a
witness violates the defendant’s rights. The Third and Seventh Circuits
have held that prosecutorial coercion violates only the witness’s, not the

283. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028–32 (9th Cir. 2003).
284. KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004); Genzler v. Longanbach, 384 F.3d
1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003); Broam, 320
F.3d at 1033.
285. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–
18 (1982).
286. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
287. Id.
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defendant’s, rights.288 The Second Circuit held that prosecutorial
misconduct in gathering evidence violates the criminal defendant’s due
process rights.289 The Court has declined to grant certiorari to resolve
this conflict,290 leaving victims without a remedy for a particularly
egregious form of prosecutorial misconduct.291
In Buckley, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit
considered the due process claim and found that it was not cognizable
under § 1983.292 The court held that coercing witnesses and paying them
for false testimony was not a constitutional wrong as to the criminally
accused, but only to the person being interrogated.293 Thus, the plaintiff
failed to state a valid due process claim.294
The Third Circuit followed the Buckley approach in Michaels v. New
Jersey,295 in which a day-care worker was indicted, tried, and convicted
of multiple counts of child abuse.296 The conviction was reversed on
appeal because prosecutors and police officers had used coercive
interview techniques with child witnesses during the investigation.297
The day-care worker brought an action against the prosecutor under §
1983.298 In concluding that the plaintiff had no remedy, the Third Circuit
held that the criminal defendant could not sue for violations of the
witnesses’ rights.299 While the court recognized that this approach left
the plaintiff without a remedy, it concluded that the policies served by
granting absolute immunity outweighed the harshness to the plaintiff and
that the “‘[h]arm to a falsely-charged defendant is remedied by
safeguards built into the judicial system—probable cause hearings,
dismissal of the charges—and into the state codes of professional
responsibility.’”300

288. Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2000); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20
F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994).
289. Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000).
290. Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118 (2001), denying cert. to 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir.
2000).
291. Id. at 1118–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
292. Buckley, 20 F.3d at 794–96.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000).
296. Id. at 120.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 121.
299. Id. at 122.
300. Id. (quoting Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1464 (3d Cir. 1992)).
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In contrast to the Buckley and Michaels decisions, the Second Circuit
has found that prosecutorial misconduct in evidence gathering violates
the accused’s due process rights.301 In Zahrey v. Coffey, prosecutors
coerced and bribed witnesses to concoct false statements against the
accused.302 Following his acquittal,303 Zahrey filed a § 1983 and a
Bivens action for wrongful prosecution.304 The Second Circuit held that
the plaintiff had stated a cause of action because he had a due process
right not to be deprived of liberty as a result of the fabrication of
evidence by a government officer acting in an investigatory capacity.305
The court acknowledged that mere fabrication—without more—would
not violate due process.306 But when that fabricated evidence causes the
deprivation of liberty, due process is violated.307 As the court explained,
“The liberty deprivation is the eight months he was confined, from his
bail revocation (after his arrest) to his acquittal, and the due process
violation is the manufacture of false evidence.”308 Additionally, the court
held that the subsequent use of the fabricated evidence by the same
official who fabricated it did not break the chain of causation.309
The seeds for this intercircuit conflict may have been planted by
Justice Scalia in his Buckley concurrence.310 In his view, claims based on
the fabrication of evidence “are unlikely to be cognizable under § 1983,
since petitioner cites, and I am aware of, no authority for the proposition
that the mere preparation of false evidence, as opposed to its use in a
fashion that deprives someone of a fair trial or otherwise harms him,
violates the Constitution.”311 This language has been construed to mean
that a prosecutor’s fabrication of evidence cannot be used to establish a
constitutional violation.312

301. Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 348–49 (2d Cir. 2000).
302. Id. at 345.
303. Id. at 346.
304. Id. at 344.
305. Id. at 348–49.
306. Id. at 348.
307. Id. at 348–49.
308. Id. at 348.
309. Id. at 353–54; see also Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1157–58 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a defendant in a criminal proceeding can challenge coerced statements by witnesses in
affidavits to obtain an arrest warrant on due process grounds); infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the
prosecutor’s in-court use of previously fabricated evidence).
310. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 279–82 (Scalia, J., concurring).
311. Id. at 281–82 (Scalia, J., concurring).
312. See McKenna, supra note 191, at 692–93.
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Justice Thomas expresses a different view. When this circuit conflict
was presented to the United States Supreme Court in a petition for
certiorari in Michaels v. McGrath, Justice Thomas dissented from the
Court’s denial of the petition.313 As he explained, “the decision below
leaves victims of egregious prosecutorial misconduct without a remedy.
In any event, even if I did not have serious doubt as to the correctness of
the decision below, I would grant certiorari to resolve the conflict among
the Courts of Appeals on this important issue.”314
Thus, the Court has left open the question of whether due process is
violated when a prosecutor coerces a witness to testify falsely against a
defendant, and the circuit courts are left in conflict.315 Given the current
composition of the Supreme Court bench, one might expect that a
majority of the current Court would find a cognizable claim.316 But even
if the Court finds a cognizable due process claim, the victim will still be
denied a remedy if absolute immunity applies. On the other hand, the
victim would be entitled to recover if qualified immunity applies since
coercing and bribing witnesses violates clearly established law. In other
words, the answer to whether a person can recover in a civil rights action
in which a prosecutor coerces a witness to testify falsely requires a
resolution of both the due process question and the immunity question.
2. Prosecutorial absolute immunity and the use of fabricated evidence
The second conflict in the courts of appeals is whether absolute
immunity applies when a prosecutor introduces tainted evidence that she
had previously procured during the investigatory phase of the
prosecution. The Third Circuit has held that absolute immunity
applies,317 while the Second and Ninth Circuits have held that qualified
immunity applies.318

313. 531 U.S. 1118, 1118–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir.
2000).
314. Id. at 1119.
315. Id.; Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000).
316. McKenna, supra note 191, at 692–93. Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and Thomas were in
the majority in Buckley in finding that the prosecutor who fabricated evidence before probable cause
existed was not entitled to absolute immunity. Justice Scalia concurred in the result. This would have
been a meaningless ruling if they were then to have held that there was no cognizable claim.
Moreover, since Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer joined the Court after the Buckley decision, it
seems more likely that the Court would recognize a cause of action.
317. Michaels, 222 F.3d at 123.
318. Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001); Zahrey, 221 F. 3d at 342.
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In Michaels v. New Jersey,319 the Third Circuit held that a prosecutor
is entitled to absolute immunity for introducing false evidence in a
judicial proceeding that she had improperly procured. As explained
above, Michaels held that coercing witnesses to testify falsely was not a
violation of the accused’s due process rights.320 While the court
recognized that the subsequent use of that coerced testimony in trial
violated the accused’s right to due process, it explained that this
constitutional wrong could not be redressed in a § 1983 action: the
prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for this conduct because it
occurred during the advocacy phase of the process.321
In contrast to the Third Circuit’s view, the Second Circuit held that a
prosecutor who uses previously falsified evidence is only entitled to
qualified immunity.322 In Zahrey, as discussed above, the prosecutor
improperly induced witnesses to make false statements.323 The
prosecutor conceded that his misconduct in the investigative phase
“entitled him, at most, to only qualified immunity,”324 but argued that his
subsequent use of the evidence in the judicial phase entitled him to
absolute immunity.325
The court rejected this argument and held that coercing witnesses
into changing their testimony was not advocacy, but a misuse of
investigative techniques.326 The court further held that the subsequent
use of that tainted evidence did not relate back so as to immunize the
prior misconduct or break the causal chain.327 While the court
acknowledged that sometimes subsequent intervening circumstances may
break the chain of proximate causation, this is generally not true when
the wrongdoer can foresee that his deliberate misconduct will contribute
to a deprivation of liberty.328 Thus, when the same person commits both
the initial act of misconduct and the subsequent intervening act directly
causing the deprivation of liberty, the intervening act is not independent
and does not break the causal chain.329 As the court explained:
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
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222 F.3d at 122.
Id. at 122–23.
Id. at 121–22.
Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 354.
Id. at 344–46.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 352–53.
Id. at 349, 356.
Id. at 352–54.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 353.
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Coffey acknowledged at oral argument that if he had fabricated
evidence and handed it to another prosecutor who unwittingly used it to
precipitate Zahrey’s loss of liberty, Coffey would be liable for the
initial act of fabrication. It would be a perverse doctrine of tort and
constitutional law that would hold liable the fabricator of evidence who
hands it to an unsuspecting prosecutor but exonerate the wrongdoer
who enlists himself in a scheme to deprive a person of liberty. If, as
alleged, Coffey fabricated evidence in his investigative role, it was at
least reasonably foreseeable that in his advocacy role he would later use
that evidence before the grand jury, with the likely result that Zahrey
would be indicted and arrested.330

The court also pointed out that allowing the prosecutor’s subsequent use
of the evidence to break the chain of causation would expand the scope
of absolute immunity to the investigatory phase.331
Like the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit held that subsequent use
of tainted evidence in a judicial proceeding does not entitle the
prosecutor to immunity for the prior misconduct.332 In Milstein v.
Cooley, the plaintiff alleged that prosecutors obtained false statements
from a witness for the purpose of prosecuting him.333 The court reasoned
that the allegation was analogous to the claim in Buckley that the
prosecutor had procured false expert testimony.334 Following Buckley,
the Ninth Circuit held that a prosecutor who fabricates evidence is only
entitled to qualified immunity for that misconduct.335 While the court
held that the prosecutor’s use of that fabricated evidence in securing an
indictment was entitled to absolute immunity,336 it found that the later
misconduct did not immunize the prior fabrication claim.337
This conflict in the courts of appeals was presented to the United
States Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari in Michaels v.
McGrath.338 The Court denied the petition with Justice Thomas
dissenting, leaving unresolved the question of whether absolute
immunity attaches when a prosecutor has fabricated evidence and then
used that evidence in a judicial proceeding.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 353–54 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 353–54 n.10.
Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1006.
Id. at 1011.
Id.
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1011.
531 U.S. 1118, denying cert. to Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000).
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3. Application of the Buckley probable cause requirement
In Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, the Court seemingly limited the
application of absolute immunity to conduct occurring after probable
cause exists.339 It held that prosecutorial misconduct that occurs before
there is probable cause to arrest a defendant is necessarily
investigative.340 As the Court explained, “A prosecutor neither is, nor
should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause
to have anyone arrested.”341 As this discussion will show, the application
of the Buckley probable cause requirement has created confusion in the
lower courts in two respects. First, the courts disagree as to whether
probable cause is always required for the application of absolute
immunity. Some courts disregard the probable cause requirement and
apply absolute immunity whenever a prosecutor’s conduct involves
initiating criminal proceedings.342 Second, the circuits are in conflict as
to when the requirement is met.343 The Ninth Circuit has recently
adopted a subjective standard,344 which undermines the entire purpose of
the immunity defense by precluding its resolution in the early stages of
the litigation.345
a. Is probable cause always required for absolute immunity to
attach? The first question—whether probable cause is always required
for absolute immunity to attach—arises out of the tension between
Imbler v. Patchman346 and Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.347 In Imbler, the
Court held that absolute immunity applied to the initiation of criminal
proceedings by the prosecutor because that conduct is intimately
connected to the judicial phase of the criminal proceeding.348 But in

339. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274; see also supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text.
340. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.
341. Id.; see also supra notes 252–55 and accompanying text.
342. Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2003); Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d
868, 877–78 (6th Cir. 2002); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2002); Moore v. Valder, 65
F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 1993).
343. Compare Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 1995), with Broam v. Bogan,
320 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2003).
344. Broam, 320 F.3d at 1029.
345. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
815–18 (1982).
346. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
347. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
348. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431.
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Buckley, the Court held that absolute immunity did not attach until after
probable cause existed.349
The Court has not explained how to harmonize these two rules. They
complement each other when the prosecutor initiates criminal
proceedings after probable cause exists. In such a case, under both
Imbler and Buckley, the prosecutor would be functioning as an advocate
and would be entitled to absolute immunity. But which rule applies when
the prosecutor initiates criminal proceedings without probable cause or
when probable cause is based on tainted evidence? Does Imbler mean
that initiating a criminal proceeding is always an advocacy function and
therefore always protected by absolute immunity, regardless of probable
cause? Or does Buckley qualify Imbler so that initiation of criminal
proceedings is only an advocacy function after probable cause exists?350
In other words, does Imbler mean that absolute immunity always applies
to the initiation of criminal proceedings despite the absence of probable
cause? Or does Buckley mean that absolute immunity can never apply
until after probable cause exists?
Several circuits, relying on Imbler and Burns, have held that absolute
immunity applies when a prosecutor initiates criminal proceedings
despite the lack of probable cause.351 These decisions seem to be at odds
with the Buckley rule that, prior to the existence of probable cause, a
prosecutor acts as an investigator, not as an advocate. For example, the
Sixth Circuit recently applied absolute immunity despite the absence of
probable cause.352 In Spurlock v. Thompson, two defendants were falsely
charged with and convicted of murder based entirely on coerced false
statements, which created probable cause.353 Ultimately an investigation
revealed that others had confessed to the murder and the convictions
were vacated.354 In the subsequent civil rights action, the Sixth Circuit
349. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.
350. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1159.
351. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a prosecutor
was entitled to absolute immunity although the defendant was falsely charged based on coerced false
statements); Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877–78 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a prosecutor
was entitled to absolute immunity even though no evidence supported the charges against the
defendant); Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a prosecutor was entitled to
absolute immunity for initiating a prosecution even though he knew the defendant was innocent, he
concealed exculpatory evidence, and he manipulated grand jury testimony); Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d
1141 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a prosecutor who twice filed charges without probable cause was
entitled to absolute immunity); see also Rose, supra note 191, at 1046–59.
352. Spurlock, 330 F.3d at 791.
353. Id. at 794.
354. Id.
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concluded that presenting false evidence at trial is an advocacy function
intimately connected with the judicial phase of the criminal trial and
therefore is protected by absolute immunity.355 But the court did not
address the role of probable cause in determining whether absolute
immunity applied, despite its acknowledgement that probable cause was
entirely based on false testimony.356 If, under Buckley, probable cause is
required before a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity, the
prosecutor should have received qualified, not absolute, immunity
because probable cause never really existed.
While these circuits essentially disregard the Buckley probable cause
requirement when the prosecutor’s conduct consists of initiating criminal
proceedings, the Ninth Circuit has tried to harmonize Imbler and
Buckley. For example, in Milstein v. Cooley,357 the plaintiff alleged that
the prosecutor acquired false statements and fabricated evidence, which
she then used to secure a grand jury indictment. Citing Buckley, the
Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor was not entitled to absolute
immunity for fabricating this evidence because the conduct occurred
before the existence of probable cause, which in fact was never met.358
But then, citing Imbler, the court held that absolute immunity applied to
the presentation of this evidence to the grand jury because that activity
initiated the criminal prosecution and thus was an advocacy function.359
Perhaps this is the proper accommodation of the two rules. But since
probable cause never existed,360 granting the prosecutor absolute
immunity seems contrary to the Buckley admonition that a prosecutor is
not entitled to be treated as an advocate before probable cause exists.
In short, while Buckley appeared to establish probable cause as the
threshold for absolute immunity,361 the lower courts have not
consistently applied this standard when the conduct at issue consists of
initiating criminal proceedings or engaging in conduct intimately
connected with the judicial phase of the proceedings.362

355. Id. at 798.
356. Id. at 799.
357. 257 F.3d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001).
358. Id. at 1011.
359. Id. at 1011–12.
360. Id. at 1011.
361. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.
362. See, e.g., Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791 (6th Cir. 2003); Higgason v. Stephens,
288 F.3d 868, 877–78 (6th Cir. 2002); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2002); Moore v.
Valder, 65 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 1993).
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b. When is the probable cause requirement satisfied? Apart from the
tension between the Imbler and Buckley approaches with respect to
whether probable cause is always required for absolute immunity, courts
are confused on the second issue, which is how to determine whether the
probable cause requirement has been met. Buckley does not provide any
guidance to the lower courts on how to determine whether probable
cause has been met or who is to determine its existence.363 Justice
Kennedy raised this potential problem in his concurring and dissenting
opinion.364 As he observed, it was not clear from the majority opinion
whether the probable cause line is crossed when the prosecutor believes
it is met or whether a determination by a neutral third party is
required.365 Does a formal finding of probable cause in the criminal
proceeding operate to collaterally estop litigation of the issue in a
subsequent civil rights action? What if the formal finding is obtained
through the use of false testimony or fabricated evidence? If the finding
of probable cause in the criminal proceeding is tainted by prosecutorial
misconduct, is probable cause to be determined by an objective, afterthe-fact analysis in the civil rights action? As the following discussion
will show, the cases considering these issues are in a state of confusion.
Some courts have held that probable cause is met when it is officially
found to exist in the initial criminal proceedings. For example, the Ninth
Circuit has found that, in some instances, a finding of probable cause in
the criminal action will collaterally estop the defendant from challenging
probable cause in a subsequent civil rights action.366 But the Ninth
Circuit has found exceptions to this rule,367 and this approach is not
followed when the official probable cause determination is gained by
presenting false evidence or withholding exculpatory evidence.368
The difficulty of determining the point at which probable cause
exists for purposes of granting the prosecutor absolute immunity is wellillustrated by a recent Ninth Circuit case, Broam v. Bogan.369 The
plaintiff was wrongly convicted of sexual abuse of his son and spent
eight years in prison as the result of misconduct by the prosecutor and
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

See Rose, supra note 191, at 1044–46.
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 287 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Haupt v. Dillard, 17 F.3d 285, 288–91 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id.; see also Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 760–61 (9th Cir. 1999).
See Morley, 175 F.3d at 760–61.
320 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2003).
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investigator.370 In the subsequent civil rights action, he alleged that the
prosecutor and investigator secretly taped exculpatory conversations that
they suppressed, interfered with psychological evaluations of the
plaintiff’s son, failed to interview witnesses, and prevented the son’s
recantation of allegations that had been elicited in “fantasy therapy.”371
The defendants asserted absolute and qualified immunity defenses, and
the district court dismissed the action.372
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding the plaintiff should have been
granted leave to amend the complaint.373 After reviewing the current
absolute immunity doctrine, the court concluded that, to resolve this
issue, it was necessary to determine whether the misconduct occurred
before or after probable cause existed.374 But because this determination
required precise details about the chronology of events and the
defendant’s subjective state of mind, the court remanded the case.375
Specifically, the court indicated that the question of probable cause
depends on the exact point in time that the defendant believed probable
cause was met. As the court stated,
[W]e cannot determine whether the alleged constitutional violations
were committed before or after Ingram concluded that probable cause
existed to arrest Broam and Manning. If these events occurred after
probable cause existed to arrest Appellants, and Ingram and Bogan’s
activities were quasi-judicial in nature, they would be protected by
absolute immunity.376

Thus, the court concluded that the determination of probable cause
depended on the exact chronology of events and the defendant’s
subjective assessment of the evidence.
The Broam case demonstrates the unworkability of the current
absolute immunity doctrine. Determining the point at which probable
cause existed in long-past criminal cases creates monumental proof
problems. Discovery into and resolution of these fact questions will be
protracted and expensive. And resolving the subjective state-of-mind
question is even more problematic. The Court has rejected subjective

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
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standards in its line of cases transforming qualified immunity from a
good-faith standard to an objective standard.377 The whole point of the
shift to an objective standard was to avoid a protracted inquiry that
required extensive discovery into factual disputes that, in turn, prevented
the resolution of the immunity question in the initial stages of the
litigation.378
Perhaps seeking to avoid this subjective, state-of-mind issue, some
courts have held that the determination of when probable cause exists is
determined by an objective, after-the-fact analysis in the civil rights
action. The Second Circuit has adopted an objective standard based on a
reconstruction of the chronology of the criminal prosecution.379 In Hill v.
City of New York,380 the plaintiff alleged that the prosecutor
manufactured videotape evidence in a child abuse prosecution. The
prosecutor contended that the videotapes at issue were made for
submission to the grand jury and thus he was entitled to absolute
immunity.381 The Second Circuit concluded that the issue did not turn on
the prosecutor’s subjective state of mind.382 Rather, the court held that if
the video was created before probable cause actually existed, then
qualified immunity would apply, regardless of the prosecutor’s
subjective state of mind.383 The court remanded the case for a
determination of the factual issues with respect to the probable cause
determination.384
Unfortunately, this approach presents nearly the same practical
problems as the Ninth Circuit approach. How is the lower court to
determine when probable cause objectively existed? Apparently, the
precise chronology of the criminal prosecution must be reconstructed.
This detailed reconstruction presents a daunting proof problem,
especially given the passage of time in myriad cases in which people
have been wrongly imprisoned for many years. Even if the record could
be accurately reconstructed, the reconstruction will necessitate extensive
discovery of the details of the investigation and will create inevitable

377. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
815–18 (1982).
378. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–18.
379. See Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653 (2d Cir. 1995).
380. Id. at 656.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 662–63.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 663.
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questions of fact as memories fade and evidence conflicts. Like the stateof-mind issue, this approach generates factual disputes that preclude
resolution of the immunity defense at the initial stage of the litigation and
prevents the immunity defense from protecting the prosecutors, not just
from liability, but also from the burden of litigation.385
Even assuming that this practical problem could be overcome, the
approach seems inconsistent with the purpose of the absolute immunity
doctrine. The purpose of absolute immunity is to ensure that the
prosecutor acts with zeal and independence, freed from the threat of civil
liability.386 But if the scope of the protection is not determined until
years later by an after-the-fact, objective analysis of the complete
criminal record, then how can this doctrine provide the prosecutor the
peace of mind that is intended?387
In short, the Buckley probable cause approach offered the hope of a
brightline test for determining whether a prosecutor was functioning as
an investigator, administrator, or advocate. In practice, however, the
Buckley probable cause requirement has generated confusion and conflict
in the lower courts both as to when it applies and how it is to be
established. Indeed, rather than providing an efficient test for
determining whether absolute immunity applies, the Buckley probable
cause requirement generates factual disputes that preclude the pretrial
resolution of the immunity defense.
4. Determining whether a prosecutor is acting as an investigator or
advocate after probable cause has been met
Assuming the courts can develop a satisfactory approach to the
determination of when probable cause is required and when it is satisfied
for purposes of the immunity defenses, they face another set of questions
about the application of the immunity defenses after probable cause has
been met.388 In Buckley, the Court held that pre-probable cause conduct

385. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
815–18 (1982) (explaining that immunity defenses should be resolved at the earliest stages of the
litigation to protect the defendant not just from liability but from the burden of litigation); see also
infra notes 604–19 and accompanying text.
386. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423–25 (1976).
387. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643 (1987) (“An immunity that has as
many variants as there are modes of official action and types of rights would not give conscientious
officials that assurance of protection that it is the object of the doctrine to provide.”).
388. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1160–61.
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is only protected by qualified immunity.389 But it recognized that postprobable cause conduct might give rise to either qualified or absolute
immunity, depending on the function being performed.390 Unfortunately,
it gave no guidance to lower courts on how to determine whether a
prosecutor is acting as an advocate or as an investigator after probable
cause has been met.391
Not surprisingly, lower courts have reached conflicting decisions on
post-probable cause immunity. The D.C. Circuit took a categorical
approach in holding that coercing witnesses to testify falsely is an
investigative function that receives only qualified immunity.392 On the
other hand, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have recently held that the
question is to be resolved by evaluating the subjective intent of the
prosecutor at the time of the misconduct—whether she intended to act as
an investigator or an advocate.393
Moore v. Valder.394 illustrates the first approach. After the plaintiff
was acquitted on fraud charges,395 he filed a Bivens action alleging that
the prosecutor had intimidated and coerced witnesses to testify falsely.396
Applying the categorical approach to the immunity question, the D.C.
Circuit held that intimidating and coercing witnesses was an
investigatory function, not advocatory.397 The court explained that the
prosecutor’s actions were “a misuse of investigative techniques
legitimately directed at exploring whether witness testimony is truthful
and complete and whether the government has acquired all incriminating
evidence. It therefore relates to a typical police function, the collection of
information to be used in a prosecution.”398
In contrast to the Moore court’s position that witness coercion is
categorically an investigative technique, the Fifth Circuit considers the
subjective state of mind of the prosecutor at the time of the misconduct

389. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.
390. Id. at 274 n.5.
391. See McKenna, supra note 191, at 691; see also Rose, supra note 191, at 1044–46.
392. See Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
393. See KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004); Genzler v. Longanbach, 384
F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003); Broam v.
Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003).
394. 65 F.3d 189.
395. Id. at 191.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 194.
398. Id.
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to determine the function she was performing.399 In Cousin v. Small, the
plaintiff alleged that prosecutors had coerced a witness to testify falsely,
leading to his wrongful murder conviction.400 The Fifth Circuit
considered the chronology of events and found that at the time of the
misconduct the prosecutor was acting as an advocate, not as an
investigator.401 The court reached this conclusion because “the interview
was intended to secure evidence that would be used in the presentation of
the state’s case at the pending trial of an already identified suspect, not to
identify a suspect or establish probable cause.”402 In other words, the
immunity that applies depends on the prosecutor’s subjective state of
mind at the time of the misconduct.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a subjective state-of-mind
test in three recent cases.403 For example, in Broam v. Bogan,404 the
plaintiff alleged that the prosecutor and investigator improperly avoided
interviewing exculpatory witnesses and withheld exculpatory evidence,
including tape recordings. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for
development of the factual chronology of events and for a determination
of whether the prosecutor was acting as an investigator or as an
advocate.405 As the court explained, the prosecutor is absolutely immune
if he was gathering evidence to present to the trier of fact, but only
protected by qualified immunity if he was conducting an investigation to
determine whether probable cause existed.406 In other words, the
prosecutor’s subjective intention determines which immunity applies.407
399. Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003).
400. Id. at 629–31.
401. Id. at 635.
402. Id. (emphasis added).
403. See KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004); Genzler v. Longanbach, 384
F.3d 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003).
404. 320 F.3d at 1027–28.
405. Id. at 1034.
406. Id. at 1033.
407. See KRL, 384 F.3d 1105. In KRL, the court held that a question of fact was presented on
the defendants’ purpose in securing a search warrant after probable cause had been met when the
warrant went beyond legitimate preparation for trial on an existing indictment and sought to collect
evidence of additional criminal activity. Id. at 1112. As the court explained, “A genuine issue of fact
certainly exists as to the extent that the search warrant sought to gather evidence to prosecute
[plaintiff] rather than to further the collateral investigation.” Id. Obviously, what the warrant “sought
to gather” depends on the drafter’s intent in drafting the warrant, in other words, the subjective state
of mind of the defendant. Moreover, in the mixed motive case in which the purpose is partly
investigatory and partly advocatory, the Ninth Circuit concluded that to the extent the warrant served
an investigative goal, qualified immunity applies, but to the extent it served an advocacy goal,
absolute immunity applies. Id. The reconstruction of the events through notes and testimony and the
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As explained above, injecting a subjective state-of-mind component
into the immunity defenses is problematic.408 The Buckley Court
cautioned against allowing prosecutors to obtain absolute immunity by
claiming that investigative functions were for advocacy purposes,409
which is exactly what this approach seems to invite. Moreover, this
approach has been rejected by the Supreme Court in the line of cases that
transformed qualified immunity from a good-faith standard to an
objective standard.410 Subjective inquiries frustrate the goal of the
immunity defense, which is to ensure the early disposition of the
litigation.411 These inquiries lead to wide-ranging discovery that “can be
peculiarly disruptive of effective government.”412
As the above discussion shows, the circuit courts are in conflict on a
number of issues arising out of the current prosecutorial immunity
doctrine. The Court could resolve these conflicts in either of two ways.
First, the Court could take up a series of cases to answer these questions
and resolve these conflicts. Alternatively, the Court could simplify the
entire area of the law by eliminating absolute prosecutorial immunity and
applying qualified immunity in all cases. The question is whether the
benefits of the absolute immunity doctrine justify the complexity and
confusion it introduces into the law. The following section addresses this

assessment of prosecutorial intent based on this reconstruction required extensive factual discovery
and presented complicated questions of fact. Id.; see also Genzler, 384 F.3d 1092.
In another case, Genzler v. Longanbach, 384 F.3d 1092, the court held that witness interviews
conducted after probable cause existed may serve either an investigative function or an advocatory
function. Id. at 1099–1100. While the timing of evidence gathering is a relevant factor in
determining function, it is not determinative. Id. at 1100. The court also focused on the nature of the
meetings with witnesses. Id. at 1100–03. It looked at the defendants’ notes about the meetings to
determine the defendants’ purpose in conducting the interviews and concluded that they
were in the process of gathering information from [the witness] during the meeting and
possibly encouraged her to lie as part of [the] process. There is little or nothing in the
notes to indicate that the meeting focused on coaching [the witness] about how to present
this information in a court proceeding.
Id. at 1103. For this reason, the court concluded that the defendants were acting in an investigatory,
not advocatory, capacity. Id. The court’s evaluation of the evidence reveals that it was trying to
reconstruct the defendants’ states of mind at the time of the misconduct to determine whether the
prosecutors were functioning as investigators or advocates for the purpose of determining which
immunity applied.
408. See supra notes 182–86 and 369–85 and accompanying text.
409. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 276.
410. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982).
411. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–18.
412. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817.
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question and concludes that, ultimately, the benefits do not justify
absolute immunity.
V. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY SHOULD APPLY TO ALL CASES
Since first adopting the prosecutorial immunity defense in civil rights
actions, the Court has supported absolute prosecutorial immunity on
historical and public policy grounds. But, as this discussion will show,
the application of absolute immunity in prosecutorial misconduct cases
misreads history and violates public policy. Qualified immunity should
be uniformly applied in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. Qualified
immunity is supported by both history and public policy. It provides
protection for the honest prosecutor from the burden and intimidation of
retaliatory litigation, while affording the victims a remedy where the
prosecutor has intentionally violated clearly established constitutional
guarantees. In addition, the uniform application of qualified immunity
will eliminate the unnecessary confusion and complexity injected into
civil rights litigation by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Finally, although the doctrine of stare decisis properly curtails the casual
overruling of precedent, when governing decisions prove to be both
wrong and unworkable, the Court should and does correct its prior
missteps.413
A. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity Is Historically Unjustified
As the Court has repeatedly explained, immunities apply in § 1983
actions because the Court has concluded that Congress did not intend to
erase established common-law immunities when it adopted § 1983.414
For this reason, the Court’s starting point for analyzing an immunity
question under § 1983 is the state of the law of immunities in 1871 when
§ 1983 was adopted.415 Thus, in the Court’s view, since legislators and
judges had absolute immunity in 1871, these immunities were
retained.416
413. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576–77 (2003); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
827–28 (1991).
414. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268; Burns v. Reed,
500 U.S. 478, 484 (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417–18 (1976).
415. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268; Burns, 500 U.S. at 484; Imbler, 424
U.S. at 417–18.
416. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (finding that absolute immunity applied to
judges in 1871); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372–76 (1951) (finding that absolute
immunity applied to legislators in 1871). But see J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the

104

2JOH-FIN

53]

5/11/2005 11:42:54 AM

Prosecutorial Immunity

But the 1871 common law with respect to prosecutorial immunity is
more difficult to establish than legislative or judicial immunity for two
reasons. First, in 1871, the office of public prosecutor as we know it
today did not exist in most states.417 Second, the first United States case
recognizing any form of immunity for a public prosecutor was decided
twenty-five years after § 1983 was adopted.418 This section will review
the common-law landscape of 1871 and explain why absolute
prosecutorial immunity cannot be justified by reference to history.
In 1871, the United States’ criminal justice system bore little
resemblance to the system we know today. In the English common-law
system, criminal prosecutions were primarily brought by the victim’s
family and friends,419 and the American system developed in part out of
History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L.J. 879, 899; John C. Filosa, Note, Prosecutorial
Immunity: No Place for Absolutes, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 980–81 (noting that of the thirty-seven
states in the Union as of 1871, only a minority of them had absolute judicial immunity at the time;
the Sparkman Court cited to those thirteen states that had absolute immunity and ignored the twentyfour others that did not have absolute immunity.); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section
1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 323–28 (1969) (stating that the assumption of common-law immunity is
wrong because the common law in the United States in 1871 did not clearly require absolute judicial
immunity: “[A] diligent congressman, looking to the federal rule in 1871, would have had no reason
not to surmise that an incorrect ruling of law, maliciously made, which deprived an individual of his
constitutional rights, would probably subject the offending judge to liability.”).
417. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124 n.11 (citing Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 99, 100–02 (1976); John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public
Prosecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 316 (1973)).
418. Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896) (holding that a prosecutor was entitled to
absolute immunity); see also Burns, 500 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); McKenna, supra note 191, at 668 n.36.
419. John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors,
47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 515–16 (1994); Andrew Sidman, Comment, The Outmoded Concept of
Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 754, 756 (1976). As one American court explained, “In an
early day in England private parties prosecuted criminal wrongs which they suffered. They obtained
an indictment from a grand jury, and it became the duty and the privilege of the person injured to
provide a prosecutor at his own expense to prosecute the indicted person.” State v. Peterson, 218
N.W. 367, 369 (Wis. 1928), quoted in Bessler, supra, at 520 n.34. While law officers of the crown
could and did regularly prosecute, these were extraordinary cases, and not the normal process except
in matters touching the interest of political authorities. Langbein, supra note 417, at 315–16. Indeed,
historically, prosecutors in most felony cases were not lawyers, but victims. Id. at 316–18. And later,
when private prosecutors retained solicitors, the private prosecutor retained control to manage the
prosecution just as a private litigant would manage a civil case. Thomas J. Robinson, Jr., Private
Prosecution in Criminal Cases, 4 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 300, 302 (1968). Since the private
prosecutor often had a stake in the litigation, revenge was often a primary motivating factor for the
prosecution. Bessler, supra, at 515 n.13. But since the private prosecutor did not need to have any
interest in the litigation, the motivation may well have been not justice, but financial gain from
rewards offered by victims or their families or from fines that were shared between the crown and
the prosecutor. Robinson, supra, at 302–03. Indeed, Blackstone observed that prosecutions were
motivated for financial reasons, not to achieve social justice since defendants were often allowed to
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this tradition.420 But even before the Revolutionary War, the colonies
had begun replacing private prosecutions with public prosecutions.421
Yet well into the nineteenth century, and despite the official
establishment of public prosecutors’ offices, the private prosecution of
crimes remained a significant feature of the American criminal justice
system.422 For example, in Pennsylvania, private prosecutions were
common.423 Thus, “[p]arents of young women prosecuted men for
seduction; husbands prosecuted their wives’ paramours for adultery;
wives prosecuted their husbands for desertion.”424 In this system, the
victims and their families often retained private lawyers to prosecute the
perpetrators of crimes against them.425 Obviously, in this tradition
prosecutors had a personal stake in the outcome and were far from
detached and unbiased participants in the process. As one commenter
observed, “At common law criminal prosecution adhered to the pure
pay complainants before judgment was entered. 2 William BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *364,
cited in Sidman, supra, at 760 n.43. But even in the case of public prosecutors, a financial incentive
often was provided for convictions. See Meares, supra note 123, at 880–81. For example, in
California in 1887, prosecutors received $15 for each conviction. Id. at 881 n.109. To put this in
perspective, $15 in 1887 would have been worth $293 in 2003. The Inflation Calculator, at
http://www.westegg.com/
inflation/infl.cgi (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). Similarly, in 1866 in Tennessee, the district attorney
general received $10 for each felony conviction and $20 for each death penalty conviction. Meares,
supra note 123, at 881 n.109. Adjusted for inflation, $10 in 1886 would have been worth $114 in
2003, and $20 in 1886 would have been worth $228 in 2003. The Inflation Calculator, at
http://www.westegg.com/inflation/infl.cgi (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
420. Bessler, supra note 419, at 515; Sidman, supra note 419, at 756.
421. Bessler, supra note 419, at 516; Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of
Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43 (1995); Sidman, supra
note 419, at 762. The origins of the American public prosecutor are traced to several European
traditions—English, French, and Dutch—but its exact heritage is an “historical enigma.” Bessler,
supra note 419, at 517; see also Robinson, supra note 419, at 308–311 (explaining the Dutch,
Scottish, and French influence on the adoption of the public prosecutor’s office in the colonies); W.
Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., The District Attorney—A Historical Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125, 128–37
(exploring the Dutch influence on the development of the public prosecutor in America).
422. Bessler, supra note 419, at 518; Ireland, supra note 421, at 43.
423. Bessler, supra note 419, at 518. “Private prosecution—one citizen taking another to court
without the intervention of the police—was the basis of law enforcement in Philadelphia and an
anchor of its legal culture, and this had been so since colonial times.” Id. at 518 n.26 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at 25 (1989)).
424. Id. at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting STEINBERG, supra note 423, at 48).
As Bessler notes, “Some private prosecutions in Philadelphia bordered on the bizarre. For example,
‘Henry Blake’s wife prosecuted him for refusing to come to bed when called and making too much
noise, preventing her from sleeping. He was bound over to come to bed when called.’” Id., at 518
n.28 (quoting STEINBERG, supra note 423, at 57).
425. Ireland, supra note 421, at 45–46.
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form of the adversary system; each aggrieved party retained his own
counsel to prosecute his private interest.”426
The persistence of the private prosecutor in the United States in the
nineteenth century after the establishment of public prosecutors’ offices
has been explained by two main factors. First, because of inadequate
funding of the office, public prosecutors were often incompetent.427
According to one delegate at the Illinois Constitutional Convention in
1847, “The [public prosecutor’s] office was generally taken by young
men who desired to become acquainted with people, and get into
practice; as soon as this was accomplished they gave way to others.”428
This view was expressed in many other jurisdictions as well.429 Second,
public prosecutors were responsible for covering vast territories, often
without any assistants, which compounded their incompetence.430
Traveling from county to county, the public prosecutor was often
unprepared for the litigation, unfamiliar with the jury pool, and
outmatched by defense counsel.431 As one delegate to the 1890–91
Kentucky Constitutional Convention explained, the public prosecutor
was “a rat in a strange garret.”432 Under these circumstances, victims and
their families hired private lawyers to handle criminal prosecutions in the
hope of securing convictions.433 Throughout the nineteenth century,
private prosecution flourished in most states.434

426. John A. J. Ward, Note, Private Prosecution—The Entrenched Anomaly, 50 N.C. L. REV.
1171, 1171 (1972).
427. Ireland, supra note 421, at 43–44.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 44. The same criticism was expressed in Kentucky, Maryland, Kansas, Nebraska,
and Florida. Id.
430. Id. at 44–45.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 45.
433. Id. 45–46.
434. Id. 48–49. Specifically, private prosecution had been officially approved in Alabama,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia. Id. at 49. North Carolina has also acknowledged that
private prosecution “is deeply rooted in North Carolina practice.” State v. Best, 186 S.E.2d 1, 3
(N.C. 1974); see also Ward, supra note 426, at 1171. To be sure, the system had its critics who
feared that the criminal defendant’s rights were prejudiced and who believed a public prosecutor was
necessary to ensure the integrity of the process. Ireland, supra note 421, at 47–48; Ward, supra note
426, at 1172–73. A few state courts—specifically, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin—
condemned the practice. Bessler, supra note 419, at 519–20. But the practice persisted well into the
twentieth century. In 1987, exercising its supervisory authority over federal courts, the United States
Supreme Court criticized the practice. Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 806–08 (1987). But, as

107

2JOH-FIN

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/11/2005 11:42:54 AM

[2005

While the office of public prosecutor was not well established in the
late nineteenth century, the tort of malicious prosecution was clearly
recognized in both the English and American common law.435 The
elements of the action were: (1) that the prosecution terminated in favor
of the plaintiff; (2) that there was no probable cause; and (3) that the
defendant acted with malice.436 Although there was no prosecutorial
immunity defense at the time, the elements of a cause of action for
malicious prosecution essentially allowed for the same result as qualified
immunity, since the plaintiff was required to prove malice and lack of
probable cause.437 As explained in Blackstone’s Commentaries, these
requirements were necessary, “[f]or it would be a very great
discouragement to the public justice of the kingdom if prosecutors, who
had a tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law
whenever their indictments miscarried.”438
And throughout the century, while malicious prosecution actions
were frequently brought against the parties who pressed criminal charges
arising out of a personal dispute,439 the lawyers privately retained to
of 1991, the high courts or legislatures of thirty states still approved some form of involvement of
private prosecutors in criminal prosecutions. Ireland, supra note 421, at 55.
435. MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, LAW OF TORTS 195 (1875) (explaining that the leading English
case of this period, Savile v. Roberts, 91 Eng. Rep. 1147 (K.B. 1698), required plaintiff to prove
malice and lack of probable cause); Schillaci, supra note 140, at 443–45.
436. Vanderbilt v. Mathis, 5 Duer 304 (N.Y. 1856); Steward v. Gromett, 7 Common Bench
Reports, New Series, 191 (Common Pleas 1859), reported in JAMES B. AMES & JEREMIAH SMITH, 1
THE LAW OF TORTS 573 (3d ed. 1910); FRANCIS M. BURDICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 249 (2d ed.
1908); THOMAS M. COOLEY, ELEMENTS OF TORTS 53–54 (1895).
437. See BURDICK, supra note 436, at 132–33. As Justice Scalia observed, “There was, of
course, no such thing as absolute prosecutorial immunity when § 1983 was adopted.” Id. at 132; see
also BURDICK, supra note 436, at 249–62; Eugene Scalia, Police Witness Immunity Under §1983, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1433, 1441–42 (1989); Schillaci, supra note 140, at 445.
438. BLACKSTONE, supra note 419, at *126.
439. See Field v. Ireland, 21 Ala. 240 (1852) (approving a malicious prosecution action
against defendant for prosecuting plaintiff for theft of goods); Long v. Rodgers, 19 Ala. 321 (1851)
(recognizing a malicious prosecution action against father for charging plaintiff with unlawfully
taking his daughter); Collins v. Fowler, 10 Ala. 858 (1846) (affirming a malicious prosecution action
against defendant for charging plaintiff with stealing two bales of cotton); Stone v. Stevens, 12
Conn. 219 (1837) (affirming a malicious prosecution action against former employer who charged
plaintiff with stealing cloth); Bourne v. Stout, 62 Ill. 261 (1871) (upholding a jury verdict in a
malicious prosecution action against defendant for charging plaintiff with stealing a horse);
Chapman v. Cawrey, 50 Ill. 512 (1869) (affirming a malicious prosecution action after a landlordtenant dispute led to charges that the tenant had made death threats); Ross v. Innis, 35 Ill. 487 (1864)
(affirming a malicious prosecution action against former employer for charging employee with
embezzlement); Jacks v. Stimpson, 13 Ill. 702 (1852) (reversing a malicious prosecution action
against defendant for charging plaintiff with cattle theft because the instructions indicated that
defendant’s belief in the plaintiff’s guilt satisfied probable cause); Shaul v. Brown, 28 Iowa 37
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prosecute crimes could also be held liable.440 For example, an 1845
Kentucky case held that an attorney could be held liable for malicious
prosecution for leading a lay justice of the peace into issuing a wrongful
order for the sheriff to seize the plaintiff’s dwelling.441 As the court

(1869) (affirming a malicious prosecution action against defendant for charges that plaintiff stole a
puppy); Faris v. Starke, 42 Ky. 4 (1842) (reversing a malicious prosecution action against defendant
for charging plaintiff with breaking into his store and stealing property because the evidence
required a new trial); Kimball v. Bates, 50 Me. 308 (1862) (reversing a malicious prosecution action
against defendant who instituted criminal proceedings to coerce plaintiff to surrender promissory
notes based on the evidence); Varrell v. Holmes, 4 Me. 168 (1826) (affirming a nonsuit in a
malicious prosecution action against defendant who instituted criminal charges arising out of land
dispute because the plaintiff failed to show want of probable cause); Boyd v. Cross, 35 Md. 194
(1872) (affirning a judgment for defendant in a malicious prosecution action against a bank cashier
for charging plaintiff with trying to pass a forged check because the evidence failed to establish
malice); Laird v. Taylor, 66 Barb. 139 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1868) (affirming a malicious prosecution
verdict against defendant for charging plaintiff with theft of horse reins); Grinnel v. Stewart, 32
Barb. 544 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1860) (setting aside the dismissal of a malicious prosecution action
against defendant for charging that plaintiff obtained property by false pretenses); Schonfield v.
Ferrer, 47 Pa. 194 (1864) (revising a malicious prosecution judgment because the judge failed to
instruct the jury on the malice requirement in an action against defendant for charging plaintiff with
horse theft in order to coerce the return of the horse); Prough v. Entriken, 11 Pa. 81 (1849)
(reversing a malicious prosecution judgment for instructional error in an action against defendant
who had plaintiff arrested on fraud charges and then extorted money from him while he was in
prison); French v. Smith, 4 Vt. 363 (1827) (reversing a malicious prosecution case because of juror
prejudice in an action against defendant for charging plaintiff with the theft of a scale).
440. Warfield v. Campbell, 35 Ala. 349 (1859) (holding that an attorney who caused plaintiff
to be arrested and imprisoned with malice and without probable cause could be held liable for
malicious prosecution); Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 536, 538–40 (1852) (holding that an attorney who
caused the wrongful imprisonment of plaintiff in civil action could be held liable for malicious
prosecution); Wood v. Weir, 44 Ky. 544 (1845) (holding that an attorney could be held liable for
malicious prosecution for maliciously inducing a justice of the peace to issue a wrongful order for
the seizure of plaintiff’s house); Staley v. Turner 21 Mo. App. 244, 251–52 (1886) (holding that an
attorney who joined with his client in bringing a criminal action with malice and without probable
cause is liable for malicious prosecution). According to the court in Staley, in such cases, the client
and the attorney are legally in the same position but
from the standpoint of sound morals, it is infinitely worse, for he prostitutes the privileges
which the state has conferred upon him of appearing in its courts as an officer of those
courts and a minister of justice. The client may, indeed, in many cases, excuse his
motives by proving that he acted under the advice of his counsel, but no such refuge is
left open to the attorney. He is learned in the law and knows the ground whereon he
stands.
Id. at 251; see McKenna, supra note 191, at 668–69 n.36 (citing a nineteenth-century treatise,
MARTIN L. NEWELL, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT AND THE ABUSE OF LEGAL
PROCESS (1892), which “provided that prosecutors were liable if there were malice and absence of
probable cause, with no distinction made between public and private prosecutors”).
441. Wood, 44 Ky. at 544.
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explained, justices of the peace rely on counsel to prepare proper
orders:442
It would be strange, therefore, if the attorney, by art and contrivance,
the abuse of the confidence reposed, and prostitution of his profession,
should procure from the Justices, from malicious motives to the
defendant, an illegal and oppressive order by which injury accrues to
the defendant, if the attorney could not be made liable for the wrong. It
is contended, that this rule will expose attorneys to perplexing
litigation, to the manifest injury of the profession. If it should, the law
knows no distinction of persons; a different rule cannot, as to them, be
recognized by this Court, from that which is applicable to others.
Besides, this is a numerous class, powerful for good or evil, and
holding them to a strict accountability, will have the effect to exalt and
dignify the profession, by purging it of ignorant, meretricious and
reckless members.443

While the actual decisions are few, case law predating 1871 suggests
that public prosecutors were equally liable for prosecutorial misconduct.
Specifically, an 1854 Massachusetts decision, Parker v. Huntington,444
held that public prosecutors could be liable for malicious prosecution. In
Parker, the plaintiff alleged that the district attorney maliciously
contrived with another to elicit testimony from the plaintiff during a
grand jury proceeding that could later be used to indict him for
perjury.445 He further alleged that the prosecutor used false testimony to
indict and convict him of perjury.446 The defendants demurred on the
grounds that the action failed to establish a conspiracy.447 The court
overruled the demurrer, holding that, although an action for malicious
prosecution had historically required conspiracy allegations, that element
was no longer required.448 As the court explained, “The plaintiff can
maintain his case by proof of a malicious prosecution by both or either of
the defendants.”449 In other words, the plaintiff stated a malicious
prosecution cause of action against the public prosecutor simply by

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

110

Id. at 546–47.
Id. at 547.
68 Mass. (2 Gray) 124 (1854); see also McKenna, supra note 191, at 668–69 n.36.
Id. at 125.
Id.
Id. at 126.
Id. at 126–28.
Id.
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alleging that he elicited and used false testimony in a criminal
prosecution.450
Thus, a hypothetical legislator in 1871 conscientiously researching
the common law on the eve of the passage of § 1983 would have found
the well-established tort of malicious prosecution,451 which had been
upheld in an action against a public prosecutor for eliciting and using
false testimony.452 Additionally, he would have found no immunity
defense to insulate the prosecutor from liability if the elements of the
cause of action were proven, for there was not a single decision affording
prosecutors any kind of immunity defense from liability for malicious
prosecution.453 Nothing in the existing common law would have
suggested to our legislator that after the adoption of § 1983 prosecutors
would escape liability for malicious prosecution under the shield of a
totally novel doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity that had never
been recognized in the common law.
Indeed, far from being a “well-settled” doctrine in 1871,454 there is
not one single case adopting any form of prosecutorial immunity until
many years later. Instead the defense of prosecutorial immunity
developed two to three decades after the adoption of § 1983 as the office
of the public prosecutor developed,455 but the courts split on whether
absolute or qualified immunity applied.456 The first case, Griffith v.
Slinkard,457 was decided in 1896, twenty-five years after § 1983 was
enacted.458 In Griffith, the Indiana Supreme Court shielded the district
attorney with absolute immunity no matter how malicious his motives.459

450. The court did suggest that the action was deficient for other reasons, citing two previous
cases. Parker, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 128 (citing Parker v. Farley, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 279 (1852);
Bacon v. Towne, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 217 (1849)). But the defect in both these cases was the failure to
sufficiently allege the criminal prosecution had terminated in the plaintiff’s favor and was unrelated
to the question of liability of a public prosecutor. Parker, 64 Mass. (2 Gray) at 280–81; Bacon, 58
Mass. (4 Cush.) at 235.
451. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132–33 (Scalia, J., concurring).
452. Parker, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 124.
453. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring).
454. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976).
455. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124 n.11.
456. Note, The Civil Liability of a District Attorney for Quasi-Judicial Acts, 73 U. PA. L. REV.
300, 304–07 (1925).
457. 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896).
458. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421.
459. Griffith, 44 N.E. 1001. In Griffith, the plaintiff alleged that the elected prosecuting
attorney had maliciously and wrongfully sought an indictment against him before the grand jury and
had wrongfully inserted his name into the indictment, even though the grand jury had decided not to
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But the very next year, a Kentucky case indicated that prosecutors could
be held liable for malicious prosecution if they acted with malice or
corrupt motives.460 This split remained for roughly the next twenty-five
years.461
For example, in 1908 the Supreme Court of California held that a
complaint stated a cause of action for malicious prosecution against the
district attorney by alleging that he had conspired with the deputy district
attorney and sheriff to falsely charge the plaintiff with a crime and that
he had convicted the plaintiff by procuring false evidence and
intimidating the jury.462 The defendants contended no action would lie
because the plaintiff had been convicted, and thus probable cause had
been met.463 The court rejected this argument stating:
Certainly, if a man has procured an unjust judgment by the knowing
use of false and perjured testimony, he has perpetrated a great private
wrong against his adversary. If that judgment is in the form of a
judgment of criminal conviction, it would be obnoxious to every one’s
sense of right and justice to say that, because the infamy had been
successful to the result of a conviction, the probable cause for the
prosecution was thus conclusively established against a man who had
thus been doubly wronged.464

return an indictment against him. Id. at 1001. The defendant thereafter caused him to be arrested
through a warrant issued based on the indictment. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s grant of a demurrer on the ground that the prosecuting attorney was acting as a judicial
officer and was therefore entitled to immunity, even though he acted maliciously. Id. at 1002. The
court also sustained the demurrer to a defamation action against the prosecutor arising from the
reading of the indictment. Id.
460. Arnold v. Hubble, 38 S.W. 1041 (Ky. Ct. App. 1897).
461. Note, supra note 456, at 304–07. Compare Carpenter v. Sibley, 94 P. 879 (Cal. 1908)
(upholding action against sheriff and district attorney for malicious prosecution), Leong Yau v.
Carden, 23 Haw. 362 (1916) (holding that prosecutor was entitled to qualified immunity when acting
within the scope of his authority), Schneider v. Shephard 158 N.W. 182 (Mich. 1916) (holding
prosecutor was not entitled to immunity), State v. Brinkman, 175 N.W. 1005 (Minn. 1920) (holding
that malicious prosecution action would lie when prosecutor acted with malice and without probable
cause), and Skeffington v. Eylward, 105 N.W. 638 (Minn. 1906) (upholding verdict against
prosecutor for malicious prosecution), with Smith v. Parman, 165 P. 663 (Kan. 1917) (holding that
prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity), Kittler v. Kelsch, 216 N.W. 898 (N.D. 1927) (holding the
state prosecutor was absolutely immune for his decision as to the sufficiency of the evidence for a
criminal prosecution), Price v. Cook, 250 P. 519 (Okla. 1926) (holding that public prosecutor enjoys
absolute immunity), and Watts v. Gerking, 222 P. 318 (Or. 1924) (holding prosecutor immune from
malicious prosecution action when performing his official duty).
462. Carpenter, 94 P. at 879–80.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 880.
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For this reason, the court upheld the plaintiff’s right to proceed in the tort
action against the prosecutor who had procured the false testimony.465
Similarly, in 1924 the Supreme Court of Oregon refused to grant a
prosecutor absolute immunity.466 While the court recognized the need to
give prosecutors sufficient breathing room to exercise their discretion,467
it stated:
But from this it does not follow that a district attorney is not to be held
accountable in a civil action for damages at the suit of an injured party
for maliciously causing the arrest of such party for a pretended offense,
which, at the time of the arrest, he knew had not been committed at all;
for in such case the district attorney is not acting in the line of his duty
or within the scope of his authority.468

While the state decisions on the immunity or liability of a public
prosecutor were in conflict from 1896 to 1927, federal law also offered
no resolution of the question during this period. The Supreme Court did
not address the question of whether a public prosecutor would enjoy
absolute or qualified immunity until 1927—fifty-six years after § 1983
was adopted.469 In that decision, the Court held that absolute immunity
applied.470 But obviously this decision does not support the conclusion
that absolute prosecutorial immunity was established in the common law
fifty years earlier when the 1871 Congress enacted § 1983.
In short, since prosecutors did not enjoy absolute immunity in 1871,
the Court’s historical justification for adopting it in §1983 actions is
unfounded. Indeed, in the opinion of some justices, the absence of a
common-law tradition of absolute immunity precludes its recognition
today.471 Specifically, in Justice Scalia’s view, although a common-law
tradition of absolute immunity is not a sufficient condition for adopting
the doctrine, it is a necessary one.472 As he explains, the Court’s “role is
to interpret the intent of [the 1871] Congress in enacting § 1983, not to

465. Id.
466. Watts, 222 P. at 322.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 322–23.
469. Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
470. Id.
471. See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493–94 (1991).
472. Burns, 500 U.S. at 497–98 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 279–80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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make a freewheeling policy choice.”473 Moreover, qualified immunity is
presumed to apply, and “the defendant bears the burden of showing that
the conduct for which he seeks immunity would have been privileged at
common law in 1871.”474 Thus if the common law is unclear, the
defendant is entitled to qualified immunity—not absolute immunity.475
Under this approach, since the common-law doctrine of absolute
prosecutorial immunity is at best unclear and, in fact, lacking any support
in case law, it should not have been recognized in § 1983 actions.
Instead of denying absolute prosecutorial immunity based on the
common law of 1871, the Imbler Court misread the 1871 common law
and erroneously concluded that prosecutors enjoyed absolute
immunity.476 As discussed above,477 the Imbler Court found that at
common law, prosecutors enjoyed absolute immunity for the same policy
reasons that judges and legislators were shielded by immunity.478
Indeed, the Court concluded that this immunity was “well settled.”479
But the Court cited no precedent recognizing prosecutorial immunity
before 1871. And as the following discussion will show, the Court’s
initial conclusions about the 1871 common law were unfounded since
none of the 1871 common-law immunities afforded prosecutors absolute
immunity.480
For purposes of this Article, there were three relevant immunities in
1871: judicial, quasi-judicial, and defamation. First, judicial immunity
extended both to public officials and to private citizens who were
473. Burns, 500 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)); see also Buckley,
509 U.S. at 268.
474. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 281 (Scalia, J., concurring).
475. Id.
476. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421–24 (1976).
477. See supra Part IV.A.
478. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–24.
479. Id. at 424.
480. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123–27 (1997), in which the Supreme Court
recognized that its prior decisions had “granted a broader immunity to public prosecutors than had
been available in malicious prosecution actions against private persons who brought prosecutions at
early common law.” Id. at 124 n.11. The Court explained that “these early cases were decided before
the office of public prosecutor in its modern form was common,” and since the office of public
prosecutor was established, “the availability of malicious prosecution actions has been curtailed.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 962 (2d Cir. 1988)). For
these reasons, the Court observed: “[T]he Court in Imbler drew guidance both from the first
American cases addressing the availability of malicious prosecution actions against public
prosecutors, and perhaps more importantly, from the policy considerations underlying the firmly
established common-law rules providing absolute immunity for judges and jurors.” Id.
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involved in resolving disputes, including “judges, jurors and grand
jurors, members of courts martial, private arbitrators, and various
assessors and commissioners.”481 As Justice Scalia has explained, “[T]he
touchstone for its applicability was performance of the function of
resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating
private rights.”482 It precluded civil liability even where the defendant
acted in bad faith and with malice.483 It was adopted to ensure that those
resolving disputes would act independently and without fear of
consequences.484 The Court explained in adopting the absolute judicial
immunity doctrine in 1872:
[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions,
without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to
answer to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of
the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom,
and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be
either respectable or useful. As observed by a distinguished English
judge, it would establish the weakness of judicial authority in a
degrading responsibility.485

But absolute judicial immunity was not extended to prosecutors, who
were liable for malicious prosecution if they acted unreasonably and in
bad faith.486
Using a functional approach, judicial immunity would not apply to
today’s public prosecutors since they function as advocates, not
independent adjudicators responsible for resolving disputes.487 Indeed,
the current law of absolute prosecutorial immunity is limited to the

481. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499–500
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); McKenna, supra note 191, at 666 n.22;
see also JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE NON-CONTRACT LAW 361–62 (1889);
BURDICK, supra note 436, at 30–31.
482. Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
483. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1966); Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1872).
484. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Stump, 435
U.S. at 349; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
485. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347; see also Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
486. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring); see supra notes 435–50 and cases cited
therein.
487. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132.
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advocacy functions of the prosecutor.488 This advocacy role is not at all
analogous to the impartial dispute-resolution function protected by
judicial immunity as it existed in 1871, but is closely analogous to the
role of the private prosecutor who could be sued for malicious
prosecution.489
Second, quasi-judicial immunity applied to public officials engaged
in official acts involving policy decisions.490 It applied where the law
“commits to any officer the duty of looking into facts, and acting upon
them, not in a way which it specifically directs, but after a discretion in
its nature judicial.”491 For example, quasi-judicial immunity protected a
tax assessor determining liability,492 a school board expelling a
student,493 a town board of equalization determining land value,494 a
court clerk,495 and a surveyor-general.496 This immunity would seem
applicable to the function of the modern public prosecutor who performs
government functions requiring the exercise of discretion.497 But quasijudicial immunity was a qualified immunity requiring good faith and thus
provides no historical support for granting prosecutors absolute
immunity.498
Finally, absolute defamation immunity applied to all statements
made in court proceedings.499 It shielded judges, jurors, witnesses, and

488. Id. at 125; Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1993).
489. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring). As Justice Scalia points out, at common
law prosecutors enjoyed no immunity, but the elements of malicious prosecution essentially gave the
prosecutor the same protection that qualified immunity would have provided since good faith would
defeat the required malice element. Id.
490. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see BISHOP, supra note 481, at 365–66; BURDICK, supra
note 436, at 35–36.
491. BISHOP, supra note 481, at 365; see also H. GERALD CHAPIN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS 150 (1917); COOLEY, supra note 436, at 161.
492. BISHOP, supra note 481, at 366 (citing Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547, 559 (1809);
Weaver v. Devendorf, 3 Denio 117 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846)).
493. Id. (citing Stewart v. Southard, 17 Ohio 402 (1848)).
494. Id. (citing Steele v. Dunham, 26 Wis. 393 (1870)).
495. Billings v. Lafferty, 31 Ill. 318, 322 (1863).
496. Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22, 44–52 (1854).
497. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478, 500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
498. Burns, 500 U.S. at 500–01 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
BISHOP, supra note 481, at 366; BURDICK, supra note 436, at 36.
499. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133; see also BISHOP, supra note 481, at 123–25.
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lawyers.500 Like judicial immunity, defamation immunity protected
defendants from liability even where they acted with bad faith.501 The
purpose of defamation immunity was to protect the public interest in the
judicial function by ensuring that the participants would not fear being
sued for their involvement.502 But this immunity applied only to
defamation actions and did not extend to malicious prosecution suits.503
Thus, applying this immunity today would insulate prosecutors in
defamation actions brought based on testimony elicited in court,504 but it
would not bar actions for due process violations, including fabricating
evidence, suppressing exculpatory evidence, coercing witnesses, or other
nontestimonial misconduct resulting in wrongful convictions.
In short, the common law of immunities in 1871 simply does not
support the Imbler Court’s conclusion that the advocacy function
performed by today’s public prosecutor would have enjoyed absolute
common-law immunity. Rather, if 1871 immunity law were applied to
today’s prosecutor, she would enjoy absolute defamation immunity for
testimony elicited in court, but only qualified immunity for other
advocacy functions.
Moreover, even assuming that the 1871 Congress intended to retain
the common law in adopting § 1983 and assuming that prosecutors
enjoyed absolute immunity under that common law, this does not
necessarily justify retaining absolute prosecutorial immunity today. The
1871 Congress presumably understood the common law system. This is
the assumption the Court made in concluding Congress intended to retain
common law immunities.505 So presumably, Congress also knew that the
common law evolved. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., explained:

500. Burns, 500 U.S. at 501 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 426 n.23 (1976); BISHOP, supra note 481, at 123–25 (noting that
for remarks of counsel to be privileged they must be pertinent to the issue); James P. Kenner, Note,
Prosecutorial Immunity: Removal of the Shield Destroys the Effectiveness of the Sword, 33
WASHBURN L.J. 402, 405–06 (1994).
501. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133; see also BISHOP, supra note 481, at 124–25.
502. See BISHOP, supra note 481, at 124–25.
503. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns, 500 U.S. at 501 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Kenner, supra note 500, at 406.
504. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring).
505. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123; Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993); Burns,
500 U.S. at 484; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417–18. As the Court explained, “the presumed legislative
intent not to eliminate the traditional immunities is our only justification for limiting the categorical
language of the statute.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 498.
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The life of the [common] law has not been logic: it has been
experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed. . . . The very considerations which
judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret
root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course,
consideration of what is expedient for the community concerned.506

Given this adaptive system and the Court’s conclusion that the 1871
Congress acted “in harmony with general principles of tort immunities
and defenses,”507 nothing in the text of § 1983 or its legislative history
supports the view that Congress intended the existing immunity doctrines
to be frozen for eternity as they existed in 1871. Assuming Congress
intended to preserve the common law, it intended to preserve an evolving
system of judicial decisionmaking, responsive to historic, economic,
social, and institutional developments, not rigid rules set for all time in
1871 concrete.
This common law evolution is exactly what has happened to the
common-law doctrine of qualified immunity.508 The Court has candidly
recognized that the common-law doctrine that existed in 1871 has proven
unsatisfactory in contemporary times.509 For this reason, the Court has
transformed the common-law quasi-judicial immunity doctrine from a
subjective good-faith standard to an objective standard based on clearly
established law.510 In doing so, the Court frankly rejected the 1871
doctrine and overruled prior precedents applying a subjective
standard.511 The Court is similarly obligated to revise the absolute
immunity doctrine if it proves unsuited to contemporary needs and
policies.512
In other words, even assuming that the Court was right about
Congress’s intent to preserve the common law and about the existence of
506. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1, 35 (1881).
507. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418.
508. See infra notes 601–16 and accompanying text.
509. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982).
510. Id.
511. See id.
512. Justice Scalia has distinguished the Court’s role in expanding and redefining qualified
immunity from its authority to expand absolute immunity. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 n.1
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In my view, the distinction is valid but
inapplicable when the argument is that absolute immunity should be restricted rather than expanded.
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absolute prosecutorial immunity in 1871, that still would not justify
adherence to that doctrine if it were ill-suited to contemporary needs.
History alone—even accurate history—is a poor justification for
retaining an unjust and unworkable common-law rule. As Justice Holmes
observed:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.513

In determining immunities under § 1983, the Court has repeatedly
explained that the common law of 1871 is the starting point for analysis.
But as this section has shown, absolute prosecutorial immunity did not
exist in 1871. The Imbler Court was mistaken in its analysis of the
analogous 1871 common-law immunities with respect to prosecutorial
functions. And if the 1871 Congress intended to retain the common law,
that does not mean it intended to adopt an immutable rule of immunity in
place of the case-by-case evolution of the common law. The historical
argument for absolute prosecutorial immunity is simply unsupportable.
B. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity Violates Public Policy
In developing the immunity defenses available in § 1983 actions, the
Court considers both historic foundations and contemporary public
policy.514 This section focuses on how absolute prosecutorial immunity
violates public policy in several important ways. First, absolute
prosecutorial immunity undermines the integrity of the criminal justice
system. Second, it denies any remedy to the victims of the egregious
abuse of government power. Third, it eliminates the needed deterrent
effect that a civil remedy would provide, especially since other checks on
prosecutorial misconduct are ineffective. Fourth, it hinders the
development of constitutional law and the implementation of structural
remedies to systemic problems. Fifth, absolute immunity is not necessary
to protect honest prosecutors from vexatious litigation since the
requirements for proving a cause of action and the defense of qualified
immunity are sufficient to eliminate unmeritorious cases. And finally,
absolute prosecutorial immunity introduces unnecessary complexity,
confusion, and conflict into the law.

513. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
514. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424–29 (1976).

119

2JOH-FIN

5/11/2005 11:42:54 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2005

1. Absolute immunity undermines the integrity of the criminal
justice system
The public prosecutor has a unique role in our criminal justice
system. One former attorney general observed that “[t]he prosecutor has
more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in
America.”515 Because of this vast power, the prosecutor has special
responsibilities:
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, . . . is not that [he] shall win a case, but that justice
shall be done. . . . He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not
at liberty to strike foul ones.516

As one court explained, this “overriding obligation of fairness [is] so
important that the Anglo-American criminal law rests on the foundation:
better the guilty escape than the innocent suffer.”517
Absolute prosecutorial immunity undermines this compelling
obligation to protect the innocent and to see that justice shall be done.
We are not concerned here with minor breaches of professional etiquette.
Prosecutors who engage in misconduct strike not just hard blows, but
criminal blows. Specifically, when a prosecutor violates a person’s due
process rights, the violation is a crime.518 Subornation of perjury is a
crime.519 Tampering with and coercing witnesses is a crime.520 Using
false evidence before a grand jury or court is a crime.521 Yet the
prosecutors who engage in this criminal conduct are not prosecuted, are
not disciplined, and are not held liable for their crimes.522
Given this reality, how can we have faith in our criminal justice
system? How can we ask or expect those most vulnerable to the misuse
of the criminal process—the poor, racial and ethnic minorities—to trust
the integrity of the criminal justice process? The ABA’s Kennedy
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
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Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 18, 18 (1940).
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Handford v. United States, 249 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1957).
18 U.S.C. § 242 (2004).
Id. § 1622.
Id. § 1512.
Id. § 1623.
See supra notes 123–31 and accompanying text.
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Commission has just released a report flagging the existence of
widespread racial and ethnic discrimination in the criminal justice
system.523 One recent commentator explored the nexus between poverty,
race, and wrongful convictions.524 In addition to the accidental events
that lead to the wrongful convictions of minorities, including faulty
eyewitness testimony in cross-racial identification,525 poverty itself is a
factor contributing to wrongful convictions.526 When prosecutorial
misconduct is added to this mix, the risk of wrongful conviction
escalates.527 According to one study, fifty-seven percent of the
wrongfully convicted who have been exonerated were AfricanAmerican.528
The justification for absolute immunity is that civil rights litigation
will chill the prosecutorial function and unduly burden the government.
But the evidence of prosecutorial misconduct resulting in wrongful
convictions529 suggests that we have sacrificed the integrity of our
criminal justice system for the sake of efficiency. This corruption of our
criminal justice system violates public policy. On the other hand, the
elimination of absolute immunity would serve public policy. As Justice
White wrote, “one would expect that the judicial process would be
protected and indeed its integrity enhanced by denial of immunity to
prosecutors who engage in unconstitutional conduct.”530 Prosecutors
must obey their solemn obligation to see that justice is done. To insure
the integrity of our system of justice, those who violate their duty by
trampling on clearly established constitutional rights must be held
accountable.

523. ABA Urges Reform of Criminal Punishment in Response to Justice Kennedy’s Invitation,
U.S. L. WK., Aug. 17, 2004, at 2092, 2093.
524. See Arthur L. Rizer, III, Justice in a Changed World: The Race Effect on Wrongful
Convictions, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 845 (2003).
525. Id. at 853–55; see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, app. 2 at 264.
526. Rizer, supra note 524, at 856–60.
527. Id. at 861–64.
528. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1, app. 2 at 267.
529. Id. app. 2 at 263 (finding prosecutorial misconduct a factor in the wrongful conviction of
innocent people in twenty-six percent of the cases in which they were later exonerated by DNA
evidence); HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at i (finding prosecutorial misconduct led to the
conviction of thirty-two innocent defendants and the reversal on appeal of more that 2000 cases
tainted by prosecutorial misconduct over a thirty year period); Armstrong & Possley, supra note 1,
Jan. 10, 1999 (finding that since 1963, 381 homicide convictions had been reversed nationwide due
to prosecutorial misconduct).
530. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
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2. Absolute immunity denies victims a remedy
The purpose of § 1983 is to provide victims of government
misconduct a remedy.531 The Supreme Court has explained that the
central purpose of the statute is to “give a remedy to parties deprived of
constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of
his position.”532 Absolute immunity defeats that purpose. As Justice
White explained, extending “absolute immunity to any group of state
officials is to negate pro tanto the very remedy which it appears
Congress sought to create.”533 The Court has recognized that absolute
immunity leaves victims uncompensated and justice unfulfilled. As the
Imbler Court stated, “[T]his immunity does leave the genuinely wronged
defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or
dishonest action deprives him of liberty.”534
The enormity of the constitutional injury cries out for a remedy.
Innocent people have had their lives ruined by deliberate and egregious
prosecutorial misconduct. Consider the innocent people who have spent
years in prisons, many on death row, for crimes they did not commit.
Consider Thomas Lee Goldstein, who spent twenty-four years in
prison;535 John Tennison, who spent thirteen years in prison;536 Ellen
531. Scholars have proposed a number of other possible remedial schemes for compensating
the wrongfully convicted. See Shawn Armbrust, When Money Isn’t Enough: The Case for Holistic
Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2004) (proposing a remedial
scheme that would address not only financial difficulties, but also health problems, lack of
education, and job training); Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts To
Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52 DRAKE L.
REV. 703 (2004) (proposing that state legislatures should adopt responsible compensation statutes
and that courts should entertain civil rights suits); Alberto V. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A
Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665 (2002) (proposing a
model state statute to award the wrongfully convicted money damages for economic and
noneconomic injuries).
532. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). (Note that the Court used the parallel citation,
R.S § 1979; today the conventional reference to the statute is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.) The compensation
justification for constitutional tort actions has been criticized on the ground that it leads courts to
narrowly interpret constitutional rights in order to prevent financial burdens on the government.
Jeffries, supra note 151, at 89–90. But Dean Jeffries recognizes that when qualified immunity
applies—which is what this Article proposes for prosecutorial immunity—this risk is minimized.
Indeed, in his view, qualified immunity promotes the development of constitutional law. Id. at 108–
09.
533. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 434 (White, J., concurring).
534. Id. at 427.
535. Judge Dismisses Murder Case, Frees Man After 24 Years, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 3, 2004, at
B2.
536. Bob Egelko, Wrongfully Convicted of Murder, Man Sues, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 28, 2004, at
B4.
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Reasonover, who spent sixteen years in prison;537 or any of the hundreds
of other innocent people who have been wrongfully convicted because of
prosecutorial misconduct.
In our legal system, intentional wrongdoers are held civilly liable to
those they injure. As one judge explained, “Privileges and immunities
against responsibility are an anathema for a democratic society and most
appropriately correctable by civil damage responsibility.”538
3. Absolute immunity allows misconduct that is unchecked by other
mechanisms
In addition to compensating victims, § 1983 liability serves as a
deterrent to government misconduct. According to Justice White, “It
should hardly need stating that, ordinarily, liability in damages for
unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct has the very desirable effect
of deterring such conduct. Indeed, this was precisely the proposition
upon which § 1983 was enacted.”539 Absolute immunity frustrates this
deterrent effect.
The Court concluded that the deterrence provided by § 1983 is not
necessary in the case of prosecutorial misconduct because of the other
numerous checks on abusive misconduct.540 The Court relied on the trial
judge, appellate review, collateral proceedings, potential criminal
liability of prosecutors, and potential disciplinary proceedings against
prosecutors in order to conclude that prosecutorial misconduct would be
deterred by other means.541 In theory perhaps that is true, but in fact it is
not. As explained in Part II of this Article, extensive research establishes
537. HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 1, at 13.
538. Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1302 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting),
vacated by 501 U.S. 1201 (1991).
539. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 442 (White, J., concurring); see, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980). The deterrent effect of monetary awards has been challenged by Professor
Daryl J. Levinson. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). In his view, the deterrent effect of
money damages actions is limited because governments do not respond to monetary liability in the
same way that private actors do. Id. at 355–57. While private actors seek to maximize financial gain
and will therefore adjust their behavior in response to financial costs, government institutions
respond to political costs and benefits. Id. at 359. Since the political effects of constitutional tort
actions are unpredictable, their deterrent effects are uncertain. Id. at 379–80. But see Myriam E.
Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort
Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845 (2001) (arguing that constitutional tort actions are an effective
deterrent to government misconduct).
540. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–29.
541. Id.
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that these mechanisms are grossly inadequate, and that misconduct
occurs frequently, undeterred, and unpunished.
Scholars have proposed a number of potential solutions to the
problem.542 But Congress has already adopted one—§ 1983, the
predominant civil rights remedy. The absolute immunity doctrine
frustrates the deterrent purpose of the statute.
4. Absolute immunity hinders the development of constitutional law and
the implementation of structural remedies to systemic problems
Civil rights litigation under § 1983 serves several important purposes
in addition to providing a remedy and deterring misconduct.543 Civil
rights litigation gives concrete meaning to abstract constitutional
language.544 Moreover, as many scholars have explained, remedies
influence rights.545 Since Monroe v. Pape was announced in 1961, §
1983 has been a primary vehicle for the evolution of constitutional
rights.546 Through this litigation, courts have defined the rights that
protect people from government misconduct and regulate the discretion
of officials to inflict injury.547 Dean John C. Jeffries explains that “the
capacity of constitutional doctrine to adapt to evolving economic,
political, and social conditions is a great strength.”548
This evolution of constitutional doctrine is fostered under a qualified
immunity regime. The first step in the qualified immunity analysis is to
determine whether the alleged wrongdoing, in fact, violated the

542. See, e.g., Meares, supra note 123, at 899; Steele, Jr., supra note 123, at 982–88; Rick A.
Bierschbach, Note, One Bite at the Apple: Reversals of Convictions Tainted by Prosecutorial
Misconduct and the Ban on Double Jeopardy, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1346 (1996); Douglas P. Currier,
Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers To Dismiss a Grand Jury Indictment—A Basis for
Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 1077 (1984); Carrissa Hessich, Note,
Prosecutorial Subornation of Perjury: Is the Fair Justice Agency the Solution We Have Been
Looking For?, 47 S.D. L. REV. 2545 (2002); Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for
Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083
(1994).
543. Park, supra note 151, at 395–96.
544. See id. at 420.
545. Id. at 420–22; see also Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1, 1 (1979); John C. Jeffries, Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259 (2000); Daryl
J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
546. 365 U.S. 167 (1961); see supra text accompanying notes 146–49.
547. Park, supra note 151, at 422–24.
548. Jeffries, supra note 151, at 97.
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Constitution.549 This requirement ensures the development of
constitutional doctrine and the evolution of appropriate standards and
constitutional norms for official conduct.550 Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained: “Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the
qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in legal standards for
official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general
public.”551
While qualified immunity permits the development of law, it does
not expose the government to excessive liability because it protects the
defendant from liability unless the law was clearly established and a
reasonable officer would have known of that law.552 In other words, if
courts announce a new constitutional rule, they will only impose liability
for future violations,553 which officers can avoid by complying with the
newly established law. This approach, according to Dean Jeffries, allows
courts to announce innovations in the evolution of constitutional law
without “fear of subjecting the government to excessive costs.”554
In addition to fostering the continuing evolution of constitutional
doctrine, individual civil rights actions bring about structural reforms to
systemic problems.555 In some cases, these actions result in broad
injunctive relief regulating government conduct. School desegregation
and prison reform cases are notable examples.556 For example, while the
Court avoids undue involvement in prison administration, it has
recognized that the Eighth Amendment provides fundamental
constitutional protections including an obligation to provide medical care
to sick and injured prisoners.557 Where prisons fall below the
constitutional minimum, injunctive relief is available to ensure humane
treatment is provided.558
549. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 n.5 (1998); see also Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002).
550. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1998); Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842 n.5.
551. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609.
552. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842 n.5.
553. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614–18.
554. Jeffries, supra note 151, at 89–90.
555. Park, supra note 151, at 440–42.
556. See id. at 445–47.
557. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see also Park, supra note 152, at 428–29.
558. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that systemic
deficiencies in a prison medical program can be remedied by injunctive relief and deferring an order
to close the facility on the condition that the state would present a plan for eradicating the
constitutional deficiencies); Morales Feliciano v. Rossello Gonzalez, 13 F. Supp. 2d 151, 210
(D.P.R. 1998) (finding that the evidence established systemic deficiencies in staffing, facilities,
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Even without injunctive relief, individual actions for money damages
can set national standards. As Justice Blackmun explained in refuting the
argument that individual prisoner cases unduly burden the federal courts,
“I suspect that improvements in prison conditions of recent years are
traceable in large part, and perhaps primarily, to actions under § 1983
challenging those conditions.”559 For example, a recent Supreme Court
decision held that restraining a prisoner by handcuffing him to a hitching
post for up to seven hours in the hot sun violated the Eighth
Amendment.560 While the plaintiff filed the case as an individual
damage action, this decision sends a national message about the
constitutional treatment of prisoners. Thus, individual damage actions
serve to set constitutional standards and correct constitutional abuses at a
national level. As one recent article concluded, “most of the rights
regulating a government official’s discretion to inflict injury upon
individuals have been established in constitutional tort actions.”561
Absolute immunity stymies the development of constitutional law
since it requires courts to dismiss actions at the earliest stages without
regard to the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim.562 For this
reason, it tends to freeze the law in a state of perpetual uncertainty. To
the extent that the frequency of prosecutorial misconduct might be
attributable to honest ignorance, qualified immunity should be adopted
so that legal standards may be developed and enforced to protect
constitutional rights. For example, in Kalina v. Fletcher, in which the
Court refused to apply absolute prosecutorial immunity, the Court
procedures, and administration of medical care caused by the deliberate indifference of officials to
basic human and health needs of prisoners; continuing in force prior orders to ensure constitutional
minimum standards are implemented); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282, 1314 (E.D. Cal.
1995) (finding that medical care for prisoners who suffer from serious mental disorders was so
inadequate that their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated, and
granting injunctive relief for the development and implementation of remedial plans).
559. Blackmun, supra note 129, at 21.
560. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 730 (2002).
561. Park, supra note 151, at 446.
562. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). The plaintiff had been sterilized
pursuant to a court order sought by her mother. Id. at 351–53. She was told she was having her
appendix removed. Id. at 353. After she married and was unable to become pregnant, she discovered
the truth. Id. She sued the judge who had granted the order on the grounds that his issuance of the
order violated her constitutional rights. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s finding of
absolute immunity without considering the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional claim. Id. at 355–
64; see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 279 (1993). In Buckley, the plaintiff alleged a
violation of due process when the prosecutor had fabricated evidence in order to convict the plaintiff.
Buckley, 259 U.S. at 262–63. The Court addressed the immunity defenses without resolving whether
the misconduct violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 267–79.
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condemned the custom of having the prosecutor swear to the facts
supporting the arrest warrant, thereby setting a national standard for
prosecutors and curtailing a practice jeopardizing constitutional
protections.563 As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky observed, “From a
practical perspective, Kalina will mean that prosecutors no longer will
file declarations in support of arrest warrants under penalty of
perjury.”564 Had absolute immunity been applied, the issue would not
have been addressed and, undoubtedly, the practice would have
continued.
In short, adopting a uniform rule of qualified immunity for
prosecutors would promote the evolution of national standards for
constitutional prosecutions, to the benefit of both prosecutors and the
public. When qualified immunity applies, the courts first address the
merits of the claim and determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct
violated the Constitution. When violations are found, prosecutors reform
their practices to avoid future liability. In this way, prosecutors will be
guided on how to conform their practice to constitutional standards, and
citizens will be protected from unconstitutional misconduct.
5. Absolute immunity is unnecessary to protect honest prosecutors
The Court held that absolute immunity was necessary to ensure that
prosecutors are not chilled in the vigorous enforcement of the criminal
law by the fear of subsequent civil liability.565 Those convicted of crimes
should not be permitted to retaliate against their prosecutors and burden
the court system with civil rights actions based on alleged prosecutorial
misconduct.566 And, as the Court has observed, even the most honest
prosecutor sometimes makes mistakes.567
But this fear of a flood of frivolous civil rights actions for
prosecutorial misconduct is exaggerated for three main reasons. First, the
requirements for imposing liability are sufficiently rigorous to eliminate
unfounded and harassing litigation. Second, qualified immunity has
become a potent defense that minimizes litigation burdens and protects
“all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

563.
564.
565.
566.
567.

Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 118 (1997).
Chemerinsky, supra note 191, at 81.
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976).
See id. at 423–24.
Id. at 425.
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law.”568 Third, courts have efficient tools for minimizing or penalizing
unmeritorious litigation.
a. The elements required to state a § 1983 action will eliminate
frivolous and vexatious litigation. The Court has explained that
prosecutors need protection from wasteful litigation. To this end, the
Court has interpreted § 1983 to impose barriers on potential litigants,
requiring them to meet two difficult standards. Specifically, the plaintiff
must show: (1) the criminal proceeding terminated in his or her favor;
and (2) the prosecutor violated the Constitution with a culpable state of
mind. This section will explain these elements.
(1) The plaintiff must prove the criminal prosecution terminated
in his or her favor. In 1976, when the Court first adopted absolute
prosecutorial immunity, it was not clear whether a plaintiff suing a
prosecutor for misconduct had to establish that the criminal prosecution
terminated in favor of the defendant.569 For this reason, the Court
understandably feared that disgruntled convicts would retaliate by suing
their prosecutors.570 But beginning in 1994 with the case of Heck v.
Humphrey,571 the Court has required plaintiffs seeking to recover for
wrongful convictions to establish that the criminal proceeding was
resolved in their favor. This development greatly reduces the threat of
unmeritorious, retaliatory litigation.
In Heck, the plaintiff (Heck) was convicted of manslaughter and
sentenced to fifteen years in prison.572 While he was serving this
sentence and while his direct appeal was pending, Heck filed a § 1983
civil rights action naming county prosecutors and a state police
investigator as defendants.573 The complaint alleged that the defendants
conducted an illegal investigation of him, destroyed exculpatory
evidence, and used an unlawful voice identification procedure against
him at trial.574 He sought compensatory and punitive damages.575 The
Court ruled that the action was not cognizable under § 1983.576

568. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494–95 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
569. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
570. See id. at 423–25.
571. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
572. Id. at 478.
573. Id. at 478–79.
574. Id. at 479.
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The Court explained that § 1983 created a species of tort liability and
that the most analogous common-law action was malicious
prosecution.577 As an element of a malicious prosecution action, the
plaintiff must allege and prove that the prior criminal proceeding
terminated in favor of the accused.578 The Court imposed this
requirement in the civil rights action for two primary reasons. First, it
avoids parallel criminal and civil litigation with possibly inconsistent
results.579 Second, it prevents a collateral attack on the conviction by
means of a civil action.580 The Heck Court ruled that this requirement
applies in any action to recover damages for an allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment.581 Thus, to bring a §1983
action, a plaintiff must prove that the challenged conviction or sentence
has been reversed on appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid, or subject to a federal writ of habeas corpus.582 The Court
concluded that the “hoary principle that civil tort actions are not
appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal
judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the
plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.”583
Thus, the Heck requirement that a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 action
must prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement largely
eliminates the potential flood of frivolous litigation that concerned the
Imbler Court.584
(2) The plaintiff must prove that the prosecutor violated the
Constitution with a culpable state of mind. Currently, requirements for
recovery under § 1983 for malicious prosecution are undefined.585 As
575. Id.
576. Id. at 487.
577. Id. at 483–84.
578. Id. at 484.
579. Id.
580. Id.
581. Id. at 486–87.
582. Id.
583. Id. at 486.
584. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1178–79.
585. As discussed above, the absolute immunity doctrine stymies the development of civil
rights law by resolving actions based on the immunity defense and avoiding an analysis of the merits
of the constitutional claim. See supra notes 543–64 and accompanying text; see also Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270 n.4 (1994). In Albright, a majority of the Court (in five separate opinions)
held that malicious prosecution actions under § 1983 should be analyzed based on the explicit text of
the Constitution, not based on common-law tort or substantive due process. See id. at 273–75; id. at
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the Court has noted, “the extent to which a claim of malicious
prosecution is actionable under § 1983 is one ‘on which there is an
embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion.’”586 But two points are
relatively clear: (1) the plaintiff must prove a violation of constitutional
law; and (2) the plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with a culpable
state of mind.
In developing the requirements for § 1983 liability, the Court has
consistently looked to analogous common-law principles.587 However,
“[a]lthough the common law tort serves as an important guidepost for
defining the constitutional cause of action, the ultimate question is
always whether the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation.”588
Thus, to establish liability for malicious prosecution under § 1983, the
plaintiff must show a violation of constitutional law, not simply a
common-law tort cause of action.589
275–91 (opinions of Scalia, Ginsberg, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., concurring). The Albright decision
generated a fair amount of uncertainty, which remains unresolved, about the viability of an action
under § 1983 for malicious prosecution. See BLUM & URBONYA, supra note 149, at 31–35; John T.
Ryan, Malicious Prosecution Claims Under Section 1983: Do Citizens Have Federal Recourse?, 64
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 776 (1996); Schillaci, supra note 140, at 439; Mary E. Williams, Constitutional
Law—Constitutional Remedy? The Third Circuit’s Approach to §1983 Malicious Prosecution
Claims, 44 VILL. L. REV. 919 (1999); Joseph G. Yannetti, Who’s on First, What’s on Second, and I
Don’t Know About the Sixth Circuit: A § 1983 Malicious Prosecution Circuit Split That Would
Confuse Even Abbott and Costello, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 513 (2003); Esther M. Schonfeld, Note,
Malicious Prosecution as a Constitutional Tort: Continued Confusion and Uncertainty, 15 TOURO
L. REV. 1681 (1999).
586. Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 n.4; see also Ryan, supra note 585, at 776; Schillaci, supra note
140, at 439; Williams, supra note 585, at 919; Yannetti, supra note 585, at 517; Schonfeld, supra
note 585, at 1681.
587. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–86 (looking to the common law tort of malicious prosecution);
see also Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1288–90 (10th Cir. 2004); Lambert v. Williams, 223
F.3d 257, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2000).
588. Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1289 (citing Taylor v. Meachum, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir.
1996)).
589. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 n.4; see also Pierce, 359 F.3d at 1289; Penn v. Harris, 296
F.3d 573, 576 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that liability for malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires
a constitutional violation); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 379–83 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that a
malicious prosecution action should be analyzed under the relevant constitutional provision);
Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that malicious prosecution
claims under § 1983 should be analyzed under the language of the Constitution itself); Lambert v.
Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2000); Pace v. City of Des Moines, 201 F.3d 1050, 1055
(8th Cir. 2000) (concluding that liability for malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires a
constitutional violation); Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 1999); Torres v.
McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 1998); Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir.
1996); Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995); Torres v. Superintendent of
Police, 893 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1990); Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 174–75 (6th Cir.
1987); Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561–62 (9th Cir. 1987).
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To establish the constitutional violation, the plaintiff must satisfy the
state-of-mind requirement imposed by the Court. In developing the
elements of constitutional claims, the Court has frequently used state-ofmind requirements to keep liability within appropriate bounds. For
example, in prison discipline cases claiming a violation of the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted maliciously and
sadistically.590 On the other hand, in prison medical cases alleging an
Eighth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.591 In
substantive due process cases, the Court imposes the shocking-to-theconscience requirement, which depends on the factual context.592 In
procedural due process cases, the Court requires a culpable state of mind
beyond mere negligence.593 By imposing these state-of-mind
requirements, the Court strikes a balance between the competing interests
of protecting the functioning of the government and the civil rights of
individuals.594
While the Court has yet to establish the state-of-mind requirement
for § 1983 actions against prosecutors, a related decision suggests that
the Court will impose a significant subjective state-of-mind requirement.
Specifically, in Heck, the plaintiff alleged that he had been wrongly
convicted because a police investigator destroyed exculpatory evidence
and introduced false evidence at trial.595 To determine whether the
complaint was cognizable, the Court turned to the most analogous
common-law tort, malicious prosecution. The Court held that no action
would lie unless the criminal proceeding had been terminated in favor of
the accused since that was an element of malicious prosecution.596 If the
Court adopts this same analogy for the state-of-mind element for § 1983

590. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–22 (1986) (adopting a malicious and sadistic
standard to avoid undue intrusion on prison operations).
591. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–06 (1976) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
was violated when prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs).
592. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845–55 (1998) (holding that in cases
involving high-speed chases, the police are not liable unless their conduct was shocking to the
conscience, which in the factual context required a showing of intent).
593. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that to establish a due process
violation, the plaintiff must show a culpable state of mind beyond mere negligence); see also
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
594. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845–55.
595. Heck, 512 U.S. at 479.
596. Id. at 484.
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prosecutorial misconduct cases, plaintiffs will be required to prove that
prosecutors acted with malice since that is an element of the commonlaw tort.597
In short, while the precise requirements for recovery for
prosecutorial misconduct remain unresolved, it is clear that the plaintiff
will be required to establish a constitutional violation, not simply a tort
cause of action.598 Moreover, the Court will undoubtedly impose a
culpable state-of-mind standard sufficient to protect government
functions and the discretion of the prosecutor. By analogizing to the
common-law tort of malicious prosecution, the Court may well require
the plaintiff to prove that the prosecutor acted with malice.599 Or the
Court may adopt the due process requirement that the conduct be
shocking to the conscience.600 But clearly the Court will follow its prior
decisions in adopting a state-of-mind requirement sufficient to protect
the government function. Because the constitutional cause of action
imposes these substantial proof requirements, the risk of unfounded
litigation is greatly reduced.
b. The defense of qualified immunity has evolved to insure that
frivolous actions are eliminated at the earliest stages of litigation. In
addition to the difficulty of establishing the elements of the cause of
action, plaintiffs will also have to overcome the potent defense of
qualified immunity. Initially, when absolute prosecutorial immunity was
first adopted,601 qualified immunity was based on the good faith and
reasonableness of the defendant.602 Today, the Court has revised this
defense to impose a purely objective standard.603 The current doctrine
affords much greater protection to defendants and minimizes the risk that
vexatious litigation will advance beyond its earliest stages.

597. Malice is an element of the common-law tort of malicious prosecution. See Schonfeld,
supra note 585, at 1704; see also Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1297 n.12 (10th Cir. 2004)
(noting that neither party questioned the malice standard in a § 1983 malicious prosecution case but
also noting that the applicable standard had yet to be determined); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 433, at 1223–25 (2000).
598. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
599. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484–86 (looking to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution).
600. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998).
601. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976).
602. Id.
603. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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The current qualified immunity doctrine is far more protective than
when Imbler was decided.604 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald the Court
“completely reformulated qualified immunity,” replacing the subjective
standard with an objective standard based on clearly established law.605
The Court candidly explained that the subjective standard was
incompatible with the need to eliminate the burdens of discovery and
litigation.606 Under the Harlow standard, an officer is liable only when
she violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”607 The change was
designed to avoid disruption of the government and permit the resolution
of weak claims on summary judgment.608 The application of qualified
immunity to most government officials reflects the Court’s view that a
balance should be struck between vindicating the rights of citizens and
protecting government officials exercising their discretion.609 The Court
has found that, “[i]n most cases, qualified immunity is sufficient to
‘protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the
related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official
authority.’”610 As Justice White explained, changing qualified immunity
to an objective standard “satisfies one of the principal concerns
underlying our recognition of absolute immunity.”611 In other words, one
of the main justifications for adopting absolute immunity no longer
exists.
In addition to transforming qualified immunity from a subjective to
an objective standard, the Court has adopted a series of practical,
procedural safeguards to insure that the qualified immunity defense can
be resolved at the earliest stages of litigation. The Court has explained
that qualified immunity is intended to protect officers not just from the
burden of liability but also from the burden of litigation.612 When the
defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, discovery on other
issues is stayed until the issue is resolved by motion to dismiss or motion

604. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 494–95 (1991).
605. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987).
606. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–16.
607. Id. at 818.
608. Burns, 500 U.S. at 495 n.8; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
609. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807.
610. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 506 (1978)).
611. Burns, 500 U.S. at 495 n.8.
612. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814–18; see also Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
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for summary judgment.613 Additionally, a defendant is entitled to an
immediate interlocutory appeal if the trial court rejects the immunity
defense.614 Thus, qualified immunity affords defendants an effective
means of avoiding unnecessary litigation so that the extraordinary
protection of absolute immunity is no longer necessary.615 As Justice
White observed, the current qualified immunity defense “provides ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.”616
Since qualified immunity is now a potent defense, it is sufficient to
protect the criminal justice system from undue disruption.617 One court
observed:
Since Imbler, the Court has expanded the protection of qualified
immunity . . . . Thus, § 1983 defendants who have qualified immunity
are now less likely to be liable, and, if not liable, are less likely to have
to go to trial since the objective qualified immunity standard lends itself
to resolution on the pleadings. This decreases the disruption to state
criminal law enforcement that would result from granting a prosecutor
only qualified immunity.618

In short, just as the elements of the cause of action have evolved to
eliminate the potential for wasteful litigation, the defense of qualified

613. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
614. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524–30.
615. See McNamara, supra note 123, at 1175–78; Weeks, supra note 123, at 877.
616. Burns, 500 U.S. at 494–95 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
617. Qualified immunity is not without critics. For example, Professor Sheldon H. Nahmod
devotes an entire section of his treatise to a critical analysis of qualified immunity. 2 NAHMOD,
supra note 133, § 8:5. As he observes, there is no data to support the Court’s conclusion that
qualified immunity is needed to protect government officials from undue burdens, and the Court did
not consider the benefits to society of imposing liability for constitutional misconduct. Id. In his
view, the Court has “limited individual liability by converting qualified immunity into the functional
equivalent of absolute immunity.” Id.; see also Sheldon Nahmod, From the Courtroom to the Street:
Court Orders and Section 1983, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 613, 641 n.125 (2002) (arguing that
under qualified immunity “much harm caused by wrongful unconstitutional conduct remains
unredressed”). But in my view this criticism is not accurate in the context of prosecutorial immunity
since the conduct at issue typically violates clearly established law. Specifically, withholding
exculpatory evidence violates Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Fabricating evidence and
witness tampering are crimes. 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 1512, 1622, 1623. Thus, under a qualified
immunity rule, the prosecutors who engage in this misconduct would be liable for violating clearly
established law of which a reasonable officer would have known. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
618. Lerwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d 435, 437 n.2 (10th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted), quoted in
McKenna, supra note 191, at 677 n.89.
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immunity has evolved to efficiently eliminate unmeritorious claims.619 It
affords ample protection to the honestly mistaken prosecutor.
c. Courts have effective tools to control and dispose of frivolous and
vexatious litigation. In addition to the liability requirements and the
protection of qualified immunity, courts have effective procedural tools
to control burdensome litigation. The Court highlighted these traditional
devices when it refused to grant immunity to the President (for his
conduct before taking office) in Clinton v. Jones.620 Though the
President decried the potential for exposure to taxing litigation,621 the
Court recognized that most frivolous lawsuits are disposed of at the
pleading or summary judgment stage with little or no involvement by the
actual defendant.622 Moreover, courts can sanction offending litigants.623
These same tools—in addition to the other safeguards discussed above—
are available to protect prosecutors from meritless litigation.
6. Absolute immunity introduces unnecessary complexity and confusion
into the law
The current absolute prosecutorial immunity defense is complicated
and difficult to apply. As Part IV.B explains, it has generated confusion
and conflict in the lower courts. Today, circuit courts are split on at least
four distinct issues related to prosecutorial immunity.624 Moreover, as
discussed above, recent decisions applying the immunity doctrine have
introduced subjective state-of-mind questions that preclude rather than
promote the early resolution of the litigation.625
The confusion and litigation generated by the absolute immunity
doctrine might be acceptable if the doctrine were justified by substantive
policy reasons. But it is not. As this discussion has shown, absolute
prosecutorial immunity violates rather than serves public policy.
Moreover, adopting qualified immunity in all cases against prosecutors
would eliminate this unwarranted confusion by applying one uniform,
objective standard. Qualified immunity properly balances the need to

619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.

McNamara, supra note 123, at 1177–78.
520 U.S. 681 (1997).
Id. at 708–10.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 708–09.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 369–78, 399–412 and accompanying text.
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protect government functions against the need to protect individual civil
rights and provides an affirmative defense that can be efficiently used in
the initial stages of the proceeding to eliminate not just the burden of
liability but also the burden of litigation.626
C. Stare Decisis Does Not Justify the Continuance of Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity
The doctrine of stare decisis rightly constrains the Court’s ability to
overrule precedent and promotes the stability of and respect for the rule
of law.627 But when the Court has adopted an erroneous rule of law that
produces unjust and inconsistent results and has not induced detrimental
reliance by individuals or society, the Court should and does reverse
course and correct the error.628 In the case of absolute prosecutorial
immunity, the Court should make this correction.629
While the Court has not been entirely consistent with respect to stare
decisis,630 the Court has identified factors suggesting that a prior
erroneous precedent should be overruled when: (1) the soundness of the
original principle is doubtful;631 (2) the foundations of the principle have
been eroded by subsequent decisions;632 (3) the principle has been
divorced from its apparent original purpose by factual and legal
changes;633 (4) the principle has generated a body of interpretative law
that is so complex that the law has become difficult to apply;634 (5) the
principle has been subject to substantial and consistent criticism;635 and
626. See supra notes 601–19 and accompanying text.
627. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1154.
628. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) (holding that a departure from the doctrine of stare decisis is
justified where a prior precedent has become “a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in
the law”).
629. See McNamara, supra note 123, at 1159–92.
630. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
631. Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 431, 435 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (1997)
(citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47–49 (1977) (reexamining an
interpretation of the Sherman Act)); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 697–715 (1995)
(reexamining an interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
664–90 (1978) (reexamining an interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
632. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577.
633. Brown, 520 U.S. at 431, 435 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 697–
715; Monell, 436 U.S. at 664–90; Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 47–49).
634. Brown, 520 U.S. at 431, 435 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 697–
715; Monell, 436 U.S. at 664–90; Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 47–49).
635. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576–77.
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(6) the principle has not induced individual and societal reliance that
counsels against overruling.636 In the case of absolute prosecutorial
immunity, all of these factors suggest that the doctrine should be
overruled.
First, as discussed above, the soundness of the doctrine of absolute
prosecutorial immunity is doubtful.637 The Court initially adopted the
doctrine based on the misconception that it reflected the common law in
1871 and that it furthered public policy.638 However, absolute
prosecutorial immunity was not available under the common law in
1871.639 Moreover, absolute prosecutorial immunity violates public
policy by undermining the integrity of the criminal justice process, by
denying victims of misconduct a remedy, by failing to deter misconduct,
and by frustrating the development of constitutional standards.640
Second, the foundations of absolute prosecutorial immunity have
been eroded by subsequent decisions. As the Court explained, qualified
immunity is usually sufficient to protect government functions and
absolute immunity is only granted when the proponent has made a strong
showing of a special need for extra protection.641 Since absolute
prosecutorial immunity was first adopted in Imbler v. Pachtman,642 each
subsequent Supreme Court decision interpreting the doctrine has
narrowed its scope to prevent its application to conduct which is outside
the prosecutor’s advocacy function. Specifically, in Burns v. Reed, the
Court held that absolute immunity does not apply to the prosecutor’s
conduct in giving legal advice to the police.643 In Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, the Court held that absolute immunity does not apply
where the prosecutor conspires with police to fabricate evidence.644 And,

636. Id.
637. See supra Part V.A–B.
638. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 420–29.
639. See supra Part V.A; see also Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124 n.11.
640. See supra Part V.B.
641. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993).
642. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
643. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 496 (1991); see also James Lappan, The Prosecutor, The
Investigator, The Administrator, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Burns v. Reed: The Hammer Has Dropped,
62 MISS. L.J. 169, 190 (1992); A. Allise Burris, Note, Qualifying Immunity in Section 1983 and
Bivens Actions, 71 TEX. L. REV. 123 (1992).
644. Buckley, 509 U.S. 259; see also Barrow, supra note 191; Thomas J. Foltz, Prosecutorial
Immunity No Longer Absolute, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1994, at 21; Angelee J. Harris, Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons: The Supreme Court Limits Absolute Immunity Protection for Prosecutors, 20 J.
CONTEMP. L. 212 (1994); Kenner, supra note 500, at 425–27 (arguing that Buckley improperly limits
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finally, in Kalina v. Fletcher, the Court held that absolute immunity does
not shield a prosecutor who makes false statements of fact in an affidavit
supporting an application for an arrest warrant.645 Thus, while Imbler
adopted a potentially expansive absolute immunity defense, in each of its
subsequent decisions the Court has limited the doctrine.
Third, factual and legal changes have divorced the principle of
absolute immunity from its original purpose. The original purpose of
absolute prosecutorial immunity was to safeguard the integrity of the
criminal justice system and to protect honest prosecutors from the burden
and distraction of harassing civil litigation.646 Rather than protecting the
integrity of the criminal justice system, absolute prosecutorial immunity
has undermined the integrity of the criminal justice system by preventing
accountability and fostering unchecked prosecutorial misconduct,
resulting in the wrongful convictions of hundreds of innocent people.647
Subsequent developments have made absolute immunity unnecessary to
protect the honest prosecutor from vexatious litigation. As explained
above, Heck (requiring the plaintiff to prove the favorable termination of
the criminal proceeding)648 and Harlow (transforming qualified
immunity into an objective standard)649 have dramatically reduced, if not
eliminated, the threat of a flood of frivolous litigation against the honest
prosecutor.650 Since the threats that the doctrine was designed to prevent
have been addressed by these related legal developments, this
justification for maintaining absolute immunity no longer exists.
Fourth, absolute prosecutorial immunity has generated a body of
interpretative law so complex that it has become difficult to apply.651 An
unworkable doctrine that creates confusion in the lower courts can
become “a positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the
law.”652 A legal doctrine that requires a great many “distinctions to

absolute prosecutorial immunity); Deborah S. Platz, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons: The Beginning of the
End for Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1919 (1994).
645. 522 U.S. at 130–31; see also Anne H. Burkett, Kalina v. Fletcher: Another Qualification
of Imbler’s Prosecutorial Immunity Doctrine, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867 (1999).
646. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–27.
647. See supra Parts II, V.B.
648. 512 U.S. at 486–87.
649. 457 U.S. at 818.
650. McNamara, supra note 123, at 1175–79.
651. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 431, 435 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989).
652. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173.
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maintain its legal life may not deserve such longevity.”653 As explained
above, absolute immunity has generated at least four circuit court splits
on its application.654 Furthermore, the doctrine requires the lower courts
to distinguish between pre- and post-probable cause conduct655 and then
to further distinguish between investigatory and advocatory conduct.656
Moreover, litigating these distinctions requires extensive discovery and
generates intricate questions of fact that defeat the goal of immunity,
which is to allow the early disposition of the litigation.657 The confusion
and complexity of the doctrine suggests that it should be reconsidered.
Fifth, members of the Court and the scholarly community have
leveled substantial and consistent criticism at the doctrine of absolute
prosecutorial immunity. Justice Scalia has repeatedly and persuasively
demonstrated that the Court’s conclusion that absolute prosecutorial
immunity existed under the common law in 1871 is simply wrong.658
Scholars have criticized the Court’s prosecutorial immunity analysis and
argued that qualified immunity for prosecutors is more in keeping with
common-law immunities659 and better supported by policy.660 Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky has repeatedly pointed out the lower courts’
confusion about the doctrine.661 As he explained: “The distinction
between investigative and prosecutorial tasks is inherently arbitrary. It is
not surprising that in the last six years, there have been three Supreme
Court decisions addressing it. Many more are likely to follow until the
Court reconsiders the desirability of its approach to prosecutorial
immunity.”662 Thus, while the circuit conflicts discussed in this paper

653. Brown, 520 U.S. at 435 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
654. See supra Part IV.B.
655. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1993).
656. Id. at 274 n.5.
657. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
817–18 (1982).
658. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132–33 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Buckley, 509
U.S. at 279–80 (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 497–98 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
659. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman & Roy S. Cohen, Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C. L.
REV. 201, 256 (1980); Richard Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the
Court’s Historical Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 748 (1987); Filosa, supra note 416, at 980–81.
660. Feinman & Cohen, supra note 659, at 261–64; Filosa, supra note 416, at 982–86.
661. Chemerinsky, supra note 192, at 1652–56.
662. Chemerinsky, supra note 191, at 82.
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have not previously been analyzed, scholars have consistently attacked
the Imbler absolute immunity doctrine.663
Sixth, overruling absolute prosecutorial immunity will not upset any
justifiable individual or societal reliance on the doctrine. As the Supreme
Court has explained, “the mainstay of stare decisis.” is “the desirability
that the law furnishes a clear guide for the conduct of individuals, to
enable them to plan their affairs with assurance against untoward
surprise.”664 People must have confidence that they can predict the legal
consequences of their actions “to facilitate the planning of primary
activity. . . . However, that confidence is threatened least by the
announcement of a new remedial rule to effectuate well-established
primary rules of behavior.”665 Under this principle, allowing a remedy
for prosecutorial misconduct is not precluded by the doctrine of stare
decisis. If qualified immunity were to apply rather than absolute
immunity, prosecutors would still be immune unless their conduct
violated clearly established law of which a reasonable officer would have
known,666 that is, “well-established primary rules of behavior.”667
Moreover, as the cases discussed in this Article illustrate, the
misconduct at issue does not involve grey areas of controversy over
which reasonable minds might differ. The cases involve blatant and often
criminal misconduct—manufacturing evidence, tampering with
witnesses, suborning perjury. Certainly, prosecutors should not be
allowed to claim that they violated clearly established law against such
misconduct in reliance on the cloak of absolute immunity to shield them
from liability. Qualified immunity provides sufficient protection to
honest prosecutors exercising discretion in uncertain areas of the law;
absolute immunity, on the other hand, protects those who deliberately
violate the Constitution. Thus, overruling absolute immunity will not
upset any legitimate expectations but will provide a needed remedy for
willful violations of clearly established constitutional law.
In short, stare decisis does not require continued adherence to the
doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Rather, the Court should

663. See, e.g., McNamara, supra note 123; see also Filosa, supra note 416; Williams, supra
note 3, at 3479–80.
664. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970) (recognizing a wrongful
death cause of action for seaman killed aboard unseaworthy vessels); see also Monell v. Dep’t. of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 699–700 (1978).
665. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403.
666. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
667. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403.
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reconsider the absolute immunity doctrine in light of the overwhelming
evidence of persistent prosecutorial misconduct, the difficult
requirements for establishing a § 1983 cause of action, and the high
degree of protection afforded to prosecutors by the current qualified
immunity defense.668
VI. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN CASES WHERE
THE PROSECUTOR HAS SUPPRESSED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE OR HAS
ENGAGED IN MISCONDUCT BEFORE ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY ATTACHED
If courts decide that absolute immunity must persist in the § 1983
framework, they should deny the doctrine’s application in two kinds of
cases: (1) cases in which the prosecutor has suppressed exculpatory
evidence; and (2) cases in which the prosecutor has engaged in
misconduct before absolute immunity attached. As the following
discussion will show, absolute immunity should not apply when a
prosecutor has suppressed evidence because immunity in such cases is
not necessary to protect the judicial process and is inconsistent with the
Court’s functional approach to absolute immunity. Neither should
absolute immunity apply to acts of misconduct during the investigative
phase because such acts are only entitled to qualified immunity under the
Court’s functional immunity doctrine.
A. Absolute Immunity Should Not Apply when the Prosecutor Has
Suppressed Exculpatory Evidence in Violation of Brady v. Maryland
In the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland,669 the Supreme Court
held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution.”670 Unfortunately, Brady violations are one of the
most common forms—if not the most common form—of prosecutorial
misconduct, yet discipline is rarely imposed.671 According to the
668. See McNamara, supra note 123, at 1137 (arguing that qualified immunity is sufficient
protection); Williams, supra note 3, at 3479–80 (same).
669. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
670. Id. at 87.
671. See Liebman, supra note 42, at 1850 (finding that sixteen percent of state post-conviction
reversals in death penalty cases resulted from “prosecutorial suppression of evidence that the
defendant is innocent or does not deserve the death penalty”); see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 1,
app. 2 at 265 (noting that prosecutorial misconduct occurs in several forms: suppression of
exculpatory evidence (forty-three percent); knowing use of false testimony (twenty-two percent);
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Innocence Project, suppression of exculpatory evidence accounts for
thirty-four percent of prosecutorial misconduct.672
The question of whether absolute immunity should be extended to
prosecutors who withhold exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady has
been debated by the Court since it first considered prosecutorial
immunity in Imbler v. Pachtman.673 In fact, Imbler focused on the
question of whether absolute or qualified immunity applied to a Brady
violation. In Imbler, the majority stated that absolute immunity should
apply.674
As the following discussion shows, the application of absolute
immunity for Brady violations should be reconsidered for three reasons.
First, it extends the doctrine beyond its proper scope since it is not
necessary to protect the judicial system or the prosecutorial function.
Second, it leaves unchecked prosecutorial misconduct that is unlikely to
be addressed by the existing procedural safeguards. And, third, it is
inconsistent with the Court’s functional approach to immunity defenses.
As the Court has repeatedly stressed, absolute prosecutorial
immunity should be confined to cases in which it is essential to the
functioning of the judicial process or the prosecutorial function.675 But
imposing liability for the suppression of exculpatory evidence poses no
threat to the judicial process or to the prosecutorial function. Unlike the
borderline judgment call a prosecutor may have to make about which
witnesses to call when the testimony is conflicting, there is no danger of
coerced witnesses (thirteen percent); improper closing argument (eight percent); false statements to
the jury (eight percent); evidence fabrication (three percent); other misconduct (three percent)).
Professor Richard Rosen wrote a detailed article cataloguing and classifying scores of instances in
which prosecutors failed to turn over exculpatory evidence as required by due process under Brady.
Rosen, supra note 123, 697–703. Yet, despite the large number of Brady violations, he found only
nine cases in which discipline of the prosecutor was even considered. See id. at 720–30. Of those
nine, three resulted in no disciplinary action, four in minor sanctions, two in censures, one in
suspension, and one in expulsion, which was later reversed. Id. at 728–30. A follow-up study found
that in the decade after the first report there were seven additional cases in which discipline was
sought for Brady violations. Weeks, supra note 123, at 881–82. In three, no discipline was imposed;
in the other four, minor discipline was imposed. Id.
672. Innocence Project, supra note 1.
673. 424 U.S. 409. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred in the
decision because in their view the pleadings did not actually present the Brady question. Id. at 432–
33, 441, 447 (White, J., concurring). They concluded that the absolute immunity recognized by the
majority was broader than that recognized at common law and broader than necessary to protect the
judicial process. Id. at 441–43 (White, J., concurring). In their view, absolute immunity should not
attach to Brady violations. Id. at 441–53 (White, J., concurring).
674. See supra Part IV.A.
675. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 437 (White, J., concurring).
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introducing excessive caution into the process by imposing liability for
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. Prosecutors should be
cautious—very cautious—in deciding whether to disclose evidence. As
the Supreme Court has explained, “‘where an official could be expected
to know that his conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights,
he should be made to hesitate.’”676
The prosecutor who fears liability on this ground can simply err on
the side of caution and disclose more evidence than is actually required.
Marginal evidence—viewed through the eyes of defense counsel—might
be the key to unraveling the case and exonerating the accused. As Justice
White explained, “A prosecutor seeking to protect himself from liability
for failure to disclose evidence may be induced to disclose more than is
required. But, this will hardly injure the judicial process. Indeed, it will
help it.”677 In other words, in deciding whether to disclose potentially
exculpatory evidence, prosecutors need not be chilled in the vigorous
exercise of their discretion; they should simply be vigilant in complying
with their Brady obligations. According to Justice White:
It is virtually impossible to identify any injury to the judicial process
resulting from a rule permitting suits for such unconstitutional conduct,
and it is very easy to identify an injury to the process resulting from a
rule which does not permit such suits. Where the reason for the rule
extending absolute immunity to prosecutors disappears, it would truly
be “monstrous to deny recovery.”678

In sum, imposing liability for suppression of exculpatory evidence poses
no threat to the judicial process and indeed would have an entirely
salutary effect.679
Moreover, unlike prosecutorial misconduct in the courtroom, the
safeguards intended to protect the innocent—the adversary process, the
threat of criminal prosecution, and professional discipline—are not
available to correct the suppression of evidence. Indeed, it is reasonable
to assume that such violations rarely come to light. Since this conduct
occurs outside of the judicial process, “the judicial process has no way to

676. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
819 (1982)).
677. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 443 (White, J., concurring).
678. Id. at 444–45 (White, J., concurring).
679. Id. (White, J., concurring).
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prevent or correct the constitutional
evidence.”680 As Justice White explained:

violation

of

suppressing

The judicial process will by definition be ignorant of the violation when
it occurs; and it is reasonable to suspect that most such violations never
surface. It is all the more important, then, to deter such violations by
permitting damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be maintained in
instances where violations do surface.681

Finally, in terms of the Court’s functional approach to prosecutorial
immunity, the prosecutor is not acting as an advocate in responding to a
request to disclose exculpatory evidence as required by Brady.682 As
Professor Joseph R. Weeks pointed out, the duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence falls on the prosecutor because that office is the repository of
the evidence gathered by the police:683 “Responding to such requests has
nothing whatsoever to do with the prosecutor’s role as advocate of the
state in determining such things as whether to prosecute, what charges to
assert, what court to bring the case before, and what evidence is to be
offered by the state at trial.”684 Thus, in the withholding of evidence,
prosecutors are not performing an advocacy function and therefore
should receive only qualified immunity.
In other words, extending absolute immunity for Brady violations is
incongruous with the functional approach to immunity. While the Court
has never considered a § 1983 case in which a police officer was sued for
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence that led to the plaintiff’s
wrongful conviction, the lower courts have uniformly held such cases are
actionable and subject only to qualified immunity.685 One of the Court’s
“unquestioned goals of . . . § 1983 jurisprudence [is] ensuring parity in

680. Id. at 443 (White, J., concurring).
681. Id. at 443–44 (White, J., concurring).
682. Weeks, supra note 123, at 876.
683. Id.
684. Id.
685. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1299–1300 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that police
chemist only entitled to qualified immunity for withholding exculpatory evidence); Newsome v.
McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 303–04 (7th Cir. 2003); Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir.
1992); Geter v. Fortenberry, 882 F.2d 167, 170–71 (5th Cir. 1989); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856
F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988); Michael Avery, Paying for Silence: The Liability of Police Officers
Under Section 1983 for Suppressing Exculpatory Evidence, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 1–
2, 47–49 (2003). According to Professor Avery, research discloses no cases in which the lower
courts have not held that a police officer may be held liable under § 1983 where the suppression of
evidence results in a wrongful conviction and incarceration. Id. at 29–30 nn.176–77.
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treatment among state actors engaged in identical functions.”686 As the
Court explained in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, when prosecutors and police
engage in the same act of misconduct, “it is ‘neither appropriate nor
justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not
the other.’”687 Where prosecutors and police engage in the same
misconduct—suppression of exculpatory evidence—they should both
receive qualified immunity.688
In short, absolute immunity for Brady violations should be
reconsidered. Its application is unwarranted by the policies underlying
the doctrine and fosters prosecutorial misconduct that is unlikely to be
checked by existing procedural safeguards. Finally, it is inconsistent with
the functional approach to immunity defenses for prosecutors to enjoy
absolute immunity for suppressing evidence while police officers only
enjoy qualified immunity for the same misconduct.
B. Absolute Immunity Should Not Apply To Shield a Prosecutor
from Liability for Prior Acts of Misconduct That Occurred
Before Absolute Immunity Attached
As discussed in Part IV.B above, confusion has arisen among lower
courts about how the immunity doctrines apply when a prosecutor has
fabricated evidence or tampered with witnesses and then introduced that
corrupted evidence in a judicial proceeding.689 This confusion is an
understandable consequence of the uncertainties surrounding the
immunity doctrines. But, in this instance, the Court has given some
guidance in two decisions, Buckley v. Fitzsimmons.690 and Kalina v.
Fletcher,691 which suggest that prosecutors who fabricate evidence
should receive qualified, not absolute, immunity.

686. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 288 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1987); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474
U.S. 193, 201(1985)).
687. Id. at 273 (quoting Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)).
688. See id.; Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) (holding that when prosecutor performs
same function as police officer in swearing to facts to support a warrant, qualified immunity
applies).
689. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28, 317–38; Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d
118 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that absolute immunity applies to introduction of tainted evidence);
Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that qualified immunity applies to
fabrication of evidence).
690. 509 U.S. at 259.
691. 522 U.S. at 118.
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In Buckley, the prosecutor conspired with police to fabricate false
evidence by retaining an unreliable anthropology expert to connect a
boot print to the accused’s boot.692 The defendant spent ten months in
jail awaiting trial.693 The expert testimony was the principal evidence
used against him at trial.694 When the jury was unable to convict, he
spent another two years in jail awaiting a retrial.695 The charges were
ultimately dismissed after the expert died.696
The Court held that the fabrication of evidence during the
investigative phase would not be protected by absolute immunity, even
though the evidence was later used in the trial.697 With respect to the
fabrication of evidence, the Court found that “there is no common-law
tradition of immunity for it, whether performed by a police officer or
prosecutor.”698 And the Court emphatically rejected the contention that a
prosecutor may shield his investigative misconduct by presenting
fabricated evidence to a grand jury or introducing it at trial because
“every prosecutor might then shield himself from liability for any
constitutional wrong against innocent citizens by ensuring that they go to
trial.”699 Thus, Buckley supports the proposition that a prosecutor who
manufactures evidence during the investigative phase cannot bootstrap
the immunity defense from qualified to absolute by introducing that
evidence in court.
Kalina supports the same conclusion.700 There the prosecutor
manufactured evidence by swearing to false statements of fact to support
an application for an arrest warrant.701 The Court rejected her claim for
absolute immunity, holding she was not acting as an advocate in
testifying as to the facts supporting the application because “[t]estifying
about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer.”702 Thus,
under Kalina, a prosecutor who creates false evidence and then submits it
to a court is not entitled to absolute immunity.

692.
693.
694.
695.
696.
697.
698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
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Buckley, 509 U.S. at 262–63; see also supra Part IV.A.3.
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 264.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 274–76.
Id. at 274 n.5.
Id. at 276.
Kalina, 522 U.S. at 118; see supra Part IV.A.4.
Kalina, 522 U.S. at 121.
Id. at 130.

2JOH-FIN

5/11/2005 11:42:54 AM

53]

Prosecutorial Immunity

The reason that these two cases fail to neatly resolve the issue is that
the Court focused on different factors in reaching its conclusions in
Buckley and Kalina. In Buckley, the Court focused on the chronology of
the case. It concluded that since the boot print evidence was evaluated
before probable cause was established, the prosecutor was necessarily
acting as an investigator, not as an advocate.703 In Kalina, the Court
focused on the fact that the prosecutor was acting as the complaining
witness, and not as an advocate.704
These cases reveal the unsatisfactory nature of the current functional
approach. A hypothetical example illustrates the problem. Assume a
defendant had been arrested after a judicial finding of probable cause.
The prosecutor then bribed a witness to sign an affidavit of false facts
and introduced that affidavit into evidence. The Buckley case would not
resolve the question because the misconduct occurred after probable
cause was established. Arguably, under Buckley, the hypothetical
prosecutor was acting as an advocate because the misconduct occurred
after the establishment of probable cause.705 And the Kalina case would
not solve the question because the prosecutor did not sign the false
affidavit as a witness. Under Kalina, she was arguably acting as an
advocate because she prepared a document for the purpose of submitting
evidence in the judicial proceeding.706 If she were acting as an advocate
under Buckley and Kalina, she would be entitled to absolute immunity.
But this result seems entirely at odds with the outcome in both decisions.
A better approach would treat all cases of evidence fabrication
identically. Rather than considering whether probable cause has been
established (the Buckley approach), or whether the prosecutor is acting as
a witness (the Kalina approach), courts should consider the nature of the
misconduct: manufacturing false evidence. It is the same offense in each
case and should be treated the same in each case. Manufacturing false
evidence is neither an investigative function nor an advocacy function; it
is a crime.707 It is equally wrong whether it occurs early or late in the
case. It is equally wrong if the prosecutor swears to the false evidence
herself or has a third party swear to it. As the Buckley Court held, there is
no common-law tradition protecting this misconduct.708 If the prosecutor
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.

Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274–76.
Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130–31.
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274.
Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129.
18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 1512, 1623 (2004).
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274–75.
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compounds the problem by persisting in the misconduct by both
preparing the false evidence and then introducing it, the subsequent
additional misconduct should not redound to the prosecutor’s benefit by
effectively extending absolute immunity beyond the judicial phase of the
proceedings.709
Moreover, as with cases involving the suppression of exculpatory
evidence, under the functional approach prosecutors and police officers
should receive the same immunity for the same misconduct. Under
existing case law, police officers are entitled to qualified immunity for
fabricating evidence.710 The prosecutor should receive no greater
protection.711 It is inconsistent and incongruous to afford prosecutors
absolute immunity for the same conduct for which police officers receive
only qualified immunity.712
If absolute immunity is retained at all, it should not be extended to
out-of-court evidence fabrication, but rather should be confined to the
narrowly defined judicial phase of the prosecution for several reasons.
First, a narrow application of absolute immunity is consistent with the
historical common-law immunities on which the Court relies as the
starting point for immunity analysis.713 Second, a narrow application
assures that the safeguards on which the Court relies to protect the
accused—defense counsel, court supervision, appellate review714—will
in fact be available.715 Third, it strikes the proper balance between
protecting the prosecutor and the accused.716 Fourth, it provides the same
immunity to prosecutors and police who engage in the same
misconduct.717 Finally, it eliminates some measure of the unnecessary
confusion complicating this area of the law.718
709. See supra Part IV.B.2; Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 352–54 (2d Cir. 2000)
(discussing whether the subsequent use of tainted evidence breaks the chain of proximate causation).
710. See Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying qualified immunity
where a police forensic chemist fabricated inculpatory evidence); Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028,
1030–31 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying qualified immunity where an FBI agent induced a jailhouse
informant to fabricate a story); Spurlock v. Satterfeld, 167 F.3d 995, 1006–07 (6th Cir. 1999)
(applying qualified immunity where an officer induced a jailhouse informant to create a false
statement).
711. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273.
712. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126 (1997).
713. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–69.
714. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
715. See id. at 443 (White, J., concurring).
716. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982).
717. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273.
718. See supra Part V.B.6.
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VII. CONCLUSION

Absolute prosecutorial immunity should be reconsidered. Empirical
studies establish that prosecutorial misconduct is a significant factor
leading to the wrongful conviction of many innocent people.719 The
supposed checks on prosecutorial misconduct fail to deter or punish
misconduct or to protect the wrongfully accused.720 Civil liability will
provide a needed check on misconduct and a needed remedy to the
victim. Qualified immunity provides sufficient protection to the honest
prosecutor while permitting the development of constitutional doctrine,
the evolution of enforceable professional norms, and the implementation
of needed remedies.721 Ultimately, prosecutorial accountability for
constitutional misconduct will enhance the integrity of the criminal
justice system.722

719.
720.
721.
722.

See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra Part V.B.
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